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ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE:
DISSENT IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
1891-1991
JOHN J. HOEFFNER*
No less an authority than Justice Holmes, the "Great Dis-
senter" himself, considered dissents generally "useless" and "unde-
sirable." While it is probable that almost every judge agrees with
Justice Holmes's characterization, it is illustrative of the causes of
dissent that almost every judge-if not too modest-probably also
can cite from personal experience cases believed to qualify as ex-
ceptions to the general rule.1 In recent years in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at an average rate of ap-
proximately once a week, a judge concludes that he or she has
found such an exceptional case, and, accordingly, dissents.
Part I of this Article will examine the benefits of dissent, and
the considerations that may lead a disagreeing judge to refrain
from writing separately. Focusing primarily upon the period before
1891, Part II will provide an historical survey of the practice of
dissent in the federal appellate courts generally. In Part III, the
emphasis will narrow to the practice of dissent in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit since its establishment in 1891, partic-
ularly concerning changes in the frequency of dissent and the pos-
sible reasons for those changes. Part IV will examine the extent to
which the various justifications of dissent appear to have animated
the dissents filed in the Second Circuit during this time. Finally,
Part V of this Article will disclose patterns in the dissents of indi-
vidual judges presently serving on the Second Circuit that may be
helpful to advocates who find themselves arguing before the court.
* B.A. 1981, Hofstra University; J.D. 1989, St. John's University School of Law. The
author is a trial attorney with the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice, specializing in employment law. Prior to commencing his current position at the
Department of Justice, he clerked for Senior Circuit Judge Lawrence W. Pierce of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
' Justice Holmes, for example, might have cited Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, in
which he, in dissent, opined upon the uselessness and undesirability of dissents generally.
193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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I. THE DECISION TO DISSENT
Why dissent? The answer is more complicated than it at first
appears. Every dissent, it may be assumed, has its genesis in the
fact that a judge disagrees with a majority of his or her colleagues
on the proper resolution of a particular case. But such disagree-
ment, while a necessary prerequisite to dissent, does not-or at
least should not-inexorably result in a formal and public expres-
sion of dissent. Disagreement with the views of a majority should
make dissent a possibility, not a certainty. The decision to dissent
ultimately must depend upon a subtle weighing and balancing of a
myriad of competing concerns, of which the perceived incorrect-
ness of the majority decision is only one factor.
A. The Case Against Dissent
Generally, the reasons a judge might choose not to dissent
when he or she disagrees with a majority opinion are grounded in
(1) prudential concerns of various types, primarily regarding the
prompt and efficient administration of justice, and (2) institutional
concerns regarding the authority and prestige of the court system.
At some point these concerns merge, but they are distinct enough
so that each may productively be considered separately.
Judge Learned Hand's comment that a dissenting opinion
"cancels the .. monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a
bench of judges so largely depends"' is an example of judicial sen-
sitivity to institutional concerns. The viewpoint expressed by
Judge Hand has.found adherents in every era in American judicial
history at least since the time of John Marshall, himself perhaps
the view's foremost advocate.3 The Warren and Burger Courts'
strenuous efforts at maintaining unanimity in school desegregation
cases implicitly demonstrates that even the members of a disputa-
tious court recognize the deleterious effect dissent may have upon
a court's authority and prestige.4 The belief is, in sum, that for
2 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
3 See generally infra Part II.A. As one commentator has noted,
To Marshall, as to many judges, a unanimous opinion carried more weight than
one that trailed with it concurrences or dissents. Separate opinions tend to sap the
legitimacy of a court. Such opinions suggest that decisions are the product of each
judge's personal predilection, rather than ineluctable deduction from "the law."
Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright & Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 785 (1981).
See generally B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 38-110, 345 (1979) (dis-
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institutional reasons, it is at times more important for an issue to
be settled unanimously than it is for the "right" result always to
appear in the form of a dissenting opinion of perhaps no practical
import.5
Judicial adherence to such a belief in a particular case de-
pends upon the disagreeing judge's evaluation of, among other
things, how wrong the majority decision is, and how important it is
that the case be settled correctly. Thus, in a case involving a close
statutory question of narrow significance, a judge is much more
likely to acquiesce silently in the majority view than in a case in-
volving a significant constitutional issue in which positions are
polarized.
In the same way that dissent can impair the authority and
prestige of a court, so too can an unfortunate byproduct of dissent:
a breakdown in collegiality among the court's members. Such a
breakdown makes it more likely that caustic language will find its
way into the opinions of the court. The result, as with negative
advertising in election campaigns, is a demeaning of both the sys-
tem and its participants.
It is true, as noted by former Justice Powell, that "judges...
may disagree strongly without personal rancor or ill will."6 One
may also suffer a blow to the head without developing permanent
brain damage. The risk of damage increases, however, with the fre-
quency of the blows. So too does the risk that rancor or ill-will will
surface in judicial opinions increase with a rise in the frequency of
dissent.
The reason for this is not difficult to fathom. A dissent always
suggests, albeit with varying degrees of explicitness, that a col-
cussing efforts by Supreme Court Justices to maintain unanimity in certain high-profile
cases).
5 See THE DOUGLAS LETs 165-67 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987) (memorandum of Justice
Douglas, dated May 17, 1954, stating that four Justices voted contrary to their view in vot-
ing for unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Brennan, In
Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 429 (1986) ("unanimity does have value") (em-
phasis in original); Johnson, Foreword: The Accidental Decision and How It Happens, 65
CALip. L. REV. 231, 252 (1977) (citing Brown and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), as cases in which the Supreme Court put aside "what must have been substantial
individual differences of opinion so that the Court could speak with the force of unanim-
ity"). Justice Brandeis, for example, did not publish many completed dissents. ZoBell, Divi-
sion of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL
L.Q. 186, 213 n.139 (1959).
a Powell, Myths & Misconceptions About the Supreme Court, 61 A.B.A. J. 1344, 1347
(1975).
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league's work is somehow suspect. Its arrival impacts, not as a blow
to the head, but perhaps as a blow to the ego. Judges typically are
not so delicate as to be unable to inure themselves to such a blow,'
but a series of dissents is likely to be received as at least annoying,
and perhaps more. .The well-known conflict between Judges Je-
rome Frank and Charles Clark in the Second Circuit during the
1940's and 1950's illustrates the danger. Judge Frank dissented
more often from Judge Clark's opinions than from the opinions of
any other judge.8 Eventually, "[t]he sheer number of disputes, the
incessant angry letters and memoranda, the dozens of sharp dis-
sents-all of these joined to forge in [Judge Clark's] mind a clear
picture of a colleague who was determinedly hostile."9
Perhaps the picture would have been more conducive to col-
legiality had the dissents been fewer; it is impossible to know for
sure. However, what is unknowable in a particular case may be as-
certained with some certainty in the general one; and, in general,
one can say with confidence that dissents damage collegiality. The
comments of a Second Circuit judge of more recent vintage, Jon 0.
Newman, regarding an analogous matter, are instructive:
Collegiality is promoted or impaired by a variety of factors,
but frequent use of the in banc practice surely poses a threat to
what is one of the essential assets of a judicial institution. I be-
lieve one reason that majority and dissenting opinions of the Sec-
ond Circuit are relatively free of the vitriolic language unfortu-
nately found in the writings of some other appellate courts is the
infrequency of the occasions when we confront each other as
members of an in banc court. Members of a panel may and often
do disagree with some vehemence, at least during the initial con-
sideration of an appeal, and sometimes the disagreement carries
A good thing, generally, though it is fortunate that most judges are not able to inure
themselves to criticism to the extent achieved by the "famous Master of the Rolls" in the
following tale told by Justice Brennan:
After hearing a half hour argument, [the Master of the Rolls, presiding on a three-
judge panel], turned to his colleague on the right and said, "John, haven't we
heard enough of this-surely we must allow this appeal." "Oh no, Chief," said
John, "I couldn't possibly vote to do that." "Oh well, John," said the Master of
the Rolls, "you're entitled to be mistaken." He then turned to his colleague on the
left. "Tom," he said, "surely you agree that this appeal must be allowed." "Oh no,
Chief," said Tom, "I emphatically agree with John." "Well then," said the Master
of the Rolls, "the appeal will be allowed and you two argue between yourselves
who will write the dissent."
Brennan, supra note 5, at 429.
M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 322 (1970).
Id. at 243.
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through to the opinion-writing stage. But in a court of thirteen
members, there is usually a period of three or four months, some-
times considerably longer, between sittings in which a particular
pair of judges will find themselves assigned to the same panel.
The vigor of a prior disagreement has time to subside. Of course,
an occasional rehearing in banc poses no threat to collegiality, but
if we were confronting one another frequently each year as mem-
bers of an in banc court, I believe there would be at least some
risk to the extremely high level of civility that now pervades our
relationships both in the decision-making and opinion-writing
phases of our work.10
While Judge Newman was not speaking of the practice of dis-
sent, the relevance of his comments seems clear. Indeed, frequent
dissent must be regarded as a greater threat to collegiality than the
"frequent use of the in banc practice" to which Judge Newman's
comments are addressed. Judge Newman's caution, after all, is
founded on the fact that such "frequent use" increases the possi-
bility of disagreement, i.e., the possibility of dissent. A direct ca-
veat against frequent dissent, on the other hand, counsels caution
in an area where conflict is not merely possible, but certain. And
just as infrequent use of the in banc procedure provides maximum
time for "[t]he vigor of a prior disagreement.., to subside," so too
does a dissent forgone. To disregard such concerns is to risk first a
worsening of a court's "level of civility," and then the manifesta-
tion of that decline in the form of the increased use of "vitriolic
language" in the opinions of the court. The almost inevitable result
is a lessening of institutional (and individual) prestige."
Besides damaging institutional prestige, the loss of collegiality
brought about by dissent also impairs a court's ability to adminis-
ter justice promptly and efficiently. The impairment, while not
possible to quantify, is equally impossible to deny. Good personal
relations surely make smooth working relations more likely, and
smooth working relations usually translate into increased effi-
11 Newman, Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 355, 369 (1989).
11 By bringing about a loss of collegiality, dissent can also damage a court's prestige by
harming the quality of the court's work. As former Second Circuit Chief Judge Wilfred
Feinberg has noted, "collegiality... improves the quality of opinions .... When members
of a panel are willing to listen to the suggestions of their colleagues regarding a proposed
disposition and ultimately regarding a proposed opinion, the work product usually benefits.
Three heads are almost always better than one." Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a
Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 385 (1984).
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ciency.12 Chief Justice Marshall was extremely sensitive to this cor-
relation: he often expressed "serious concern about seemingly
petty trifles, such as the choice of a boardinghouse commonly
shared by the Court members... because he felt that close social
relations were essential to decision-making uniformity. 1 3 When it
appeared in his thirtieth year on the Court that the Justices would
not share a common boardinghouse, the Chief Justice predicted a
negative impact on the Court's efficiency in a letter to Justice Jo-
seph Story: "I think . . . if the Judges scatter ad libitum, the
docket, I fear, will .. .los[e] very few of its causes .... 1
In addition to reducing a court's efficiency through its indirect
effect on collegiality, a dissent also works to achieve the same end
more directly. It is a simple and incontestable fact that dissents
take time-time to write, time to respond to-that might other-
wise be dedicated to completing a majority opinion of one's own or
studying a draft of a colleague's. A dissent thus delays the prompt
resolution of not only the case in which it is made, but other cases
as well.
Concededly, this concern appears at first a bit unseemly, more
suggestive of an assembly line than of a courtroom. But with the
adage about justice delayed being justice denied nicely encapsu-
lating the reason why, promptness in decision-making has been
long recognized as an independent value of some weight. 15 The rea-
sons for this recognition are numerous. Delay, for example, "in-
creases the pressure for settlement and improves the bargaining
position of undeserving litigants who are sheltered by it. [It also]
may result in the deterioration of evidence and thus impair the
ultimate quality of decisions in cases in which new trials are re-
12 See Feinberg, supra note 11, at 384. As Judge Feinberg has noted, "[t]he essence of a
smoothly functioning court is collegiality. That spirit extends to every aspect of the court's
operation: the number of cases it disposes of, the speed of disposition and the quality of the
judicial work product." Id. See generally Goldman & Lamb, Prologue, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT
AND CONSENSUS 2 (S. Goldman & C. Lamb eds. 1986) (noting negative impact on efficiency
that results "[i]f a reasonable degree of consensus is not reached through amicable give-and-
take"); Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REV. 887, 905-07 (1987) (collegi-
ality among judges is a factor affecting judicial decision-making).
1" J. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY 113
(1979).
14 Id. at 114 (quoting letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 3, 1831)).
15 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action") (emphasis added).
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quired."1 It is for these reasons, among others, that Learned
Hand, recognizing the importance of prompt decision-making, ad-
monished Judge Clark: "After you and [Judge Frank] get through
amending your opinions, and stop shouting, for God's sake file the
opinions." 17 And for the same reasons, judges of the Second Circuit
have taken justifiable pride in the circuit's status as the court with
the lowest median time in the nation for processing appeals during
most of the last decade.18
Prudential considerations of another sort also work to limit
dissent. Most published dissents, as far as the particular issue in
,6 Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Func-
tion of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 554 (1969). In 1978, then-Chief
Judge Irving R. Kaufman expressed similar thoughts while addressing an in banc Special
Session of the Second Circuit:
Speed, of course, is not an end in itself. No court can adequately fulfill its role
merely by churning out dispositions. Each individual who appears before judges
deserves a fair hearing and the benefit of their considered and reasoned judgment.
But when courts are insensitive to the need to maintain the machinery of justice
in proper working order, they are short-changing litigants and being unfair to the
consumers of justice. Poor management increases the expense and time necessary
for the resolution of even the simplest dispute. Cost and delay, the twin demons of
the judicial process, may deter some from seeking vindication of their rights. Un-
principled reliance on plea-bargaining is a by-product of this. And these demons
may lead other litigants to compromise valid claims. Unfortunately, all too often,
the cost of a forced settlement is far less than the price of justice. Accordingly,
courts are everywhere being exhorted, by poor litigants and large corporations
alike, to exorcise these demons. If we ignore these pleas, we risk the loss of public
confidence.
Proceedings from the Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit 21 (June 26, 1978), in 578 F.2d [hereinafter Special Session].
" Memorandum from Learned Hand to Charles Clark (Nov. 26, 1943), quoted in M.
SCHICK, supra note 8, at 241. Apparently, Judge Hand adopted such an exasperated tone
only after he failed in an attempt to effect change in his argumentative colleagues by affect-
ing a tone of disapproving resignation:
I like to dance in the moonlight as well as any man, but my wind is not as good as
it once was, and I cannot keep time with the antiphonal strophe and antistrophe
of my youthful colleagues. "When, as, and if" between you-and supposing that
happy time shall ever arrive-you come to the point of exhaustion, I shall play
upon the harp and timbrel and lift up my voice in praise to God. BUT, while all
this agitating cerebration remains in parturition, I shall merely sit on the side
lines, contemplate my navel, and repeat the syllable, OM.
Id. (quoting memorandum from Learned Hand on Petition for Rehearing in Cover v.
Schwartz (Jan. 6, 1943)).
'8 See United States v. Delia, 925 F.2d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1991); Feinberg, supra note 11,
at 385; Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management
Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 761 (1986); Newman, supra note 10, at 382; Newman, Foreword: In
Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 365,
382 (1984).
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dispute is concerned, are exercises in futility, "full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing,"' 9 affecting as they do neither the resolu-
tion of a particular case nor the future course of the law. Pennsyl-
vania once thought dissents were of such little utility that by stat-
ute it forbade their publication in its state reporter.20
Pennsylvania's cure was surely worse than the disease, but the im-
portance of dissent frequently is exaggerated. It has been noted
that no more than one-tenth of the dissents of Justice Holmes
were of any future significance;"' and indeed, even this estimate
may be inflated: "One must not too readily assume [the existence
of a causal relationship between a prior dissent and the present
law]. Fortuitous predictions should be distinguished from actual
influence.122
Judges are aware of the futility of most dissents. Admittedly,
by itself this awareness might do little to discourage the practice in
a particular case. There is a huge difference between perceiving an
action as certainly futile and perceiving it as almost certainly fu-
tile-it is on the exploitation of this difference that lotteries are
built. A dissent is a judge's lottery ticket, hope springs eternal even
behind the chambers' door, and, absent other considerations, given
an inch of hope, a disagreeing judge might be inclined to take six
columns of the Federal Reporter. The institutional and prudential
considerations noted earlier are always present, however, and the
expectation of a dissent's futility probably strengthens the sway of
these considerations, and it thereby indirectly reduces the inci-
dence of dissent. The decision to dissent always involves a risk-
benefit analysis; awareness of the improbability that any benefit
will accrue surely makes it all the more difficult to discount the
dangers.
B. The Case for Dissent
The benefits of dissent are of two types: the first type reflects
W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, at V.v. 219-20. Speaking of prudential concerns, the au-
thor hereby emphasizes, stresses, highlights, underscores, and underlines what should hardly
be necessary to note: that more extensive quotation of Macbeth's statement would be en-
tirely inappropriate.
20 See Act of April 18, 1845, Pa. Laws 374; see also Simpson, Dissenting Opinions, 71
U. PA. L. REv. 205, 206-08 (1922) (historical discussion of Pennsylvania statute prohibiting
publication of dissents).
21 ZoBell, supra note 5, at 211.
22 Id.
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broad, system-wide concerns; the second, concerns limited to the
particular issues on which the dissent is based. The broad, system-
wide benefits are unlikely to act as a conscious influence upon the
decision to dissent in most cases, but in assessing the value of dis-
sent, such benefits are of more than incidental importance.
The most significant of the broader benefits arises from the
fact that the mere possibility of dissent tends to assure diligence
on the part of the writer of the majority opinion. The possibility
that flaws in reasoning will be exposed by a dissent is a powerful
disincentive to any inclination to, in Learned Hand's phrase, "win
the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table."23 The threat
of dissent, as much as dissent itself, "improves the final product by
forcing the prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged
by the losing side."'24
The next system-wide benefit attributable to dissent is that "it
indicates that the case was considered by the full bench of judges
who sat and that the opinion of the court was not perfunctorily
adopted as written by one judge. ' 25 It thus helps to satisfy, if not
the reality of justice, at least its appearance. 26
The last of the broad benefits attributable to dissent is that
the possibility of dissent contributes to the job satisfaction of ap-
pellate judges, not an insignificant consideration at a time when
judges are leaving the federal bench in unprecedented numbers.
Second Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg has noted that "[t]here is a
23 L. HAND, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 131 (1960). A California
Supreme Court Justice has remarked that "[s]o long as there is a dissenter on any court, the
other justices will examine carefully their own views on any particular subject." Carter, Dis-
senting Opinions, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 118, 118 (1952).
11 Brennan, supra note 5, at 430. In the view of one commentator, even this incentive is
not sufficient to eradicate "the accidental decision," i.e., the obviously wrong decision "not
easy to explain on any theory other than that some members of the court simply did not pay
attention." Johnson, supra note 5, at 233. Whatever the extent to which this explanation is
correct, were it not for the threat of dissent, "accidental decisions" would surely be much
more prevalent.
25 Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi, The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795
(1953); see also Carter, supra note 23, at 119 ("[w]hen there is a dissenting opinion, the
attorney for the losing side can be assured that the case has received a thorough airing in
the conference room and that the majority opinion is not a one-man decision blindly con-
curred in by the other justices").
26 Of course, dissent can also undercut the appearance of justice by "emphasizing the
personal composition of courts." Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690-97 (1905),
quoted in J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 13, at 172.
27 Cf. Oakes, Grace Notes on "Grace Under Pressure," 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 701, 715 (1989)
("judges' morale is . . . at an all-time low").
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special affection for dissenting opinions, those often-neglected and
frail judicial offspring."2 Not every judge, it is true, is so enamored
of dissent as was Justice Douglas, who (at least according to Chief
Justice Rehnquist) sometimes gave "the impression that he was
disappointed to have other people agree with his views in a partic-
ular case, because he would therefore be unable to write a stinging
dissent."29 The dissent is, however, the forum in which the contri-
bution of the individual judge is most apparent. A reversal by the
Supreme Court or an in banc circuit court based upon the argu-
ments offered by one in dissent is surely a most rewarding affirma-
tion of one's judgment and legal ability; the possibility of such vin-
dication goes a considerable way in providing some relief from the
accumulated frustrations of repressed disagreements that are an
inevitable part of the appellate judge's professional life.30
The narrower benefit of dissent is obvious: dissent can influ-
ence the development of a particular branch of the law in the di-
rection the dissenter desires. The probability that it will do so is
something the dissenter should assess at every stage until filing. A
full assessment requires the dissenter to measure the probable in-
fluence of the dissent on the decision-making of three distinct
audiences: (1) the majority; (2) "higher authority"; and (3) "lower
authority."
The first audience the dissenter seeks to influence is the ma-
jority. Since a disagreeing judge may register disagreement with
this audience without filing a formal dissent-indeed, the "dis-
sent" may originally be cast in the form of a suggestion in a memo-
randum-the risks are relatively low. An unpublished dissenting
draft opinion does nothing to damage institutional prestige,
and-as long as it remains unpublished-little to damage collegial-
ity. Accordingly, in internal memoranda or in an unpublished draft
dissent, a judge may be more inclined to advocate views less
strongly held and of a less central nature than might be appropri-
ate in a published dissent.31 The result may be to persuade the
28 Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1300 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974) (Fein-
berg, J., concurring).
29 W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 255 (1987).
20 See W. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960). Indeed, Justice Douglas wrote that
"[t]he right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a judge of an appellate
court." Id.
3' It is suggested that the disagreeing judge should at least believe in his proposed opin-
ion to a greater extent than the judge who, when told that his draft dissent had persuaded
his colleagues to adopt his view, expressed alarm because he was not sure he wanted that
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majority to adopt the minority view.32 Thus, at least initially, the
most effective dissent is one that makes its publication as a dissent
unnecessary.
When a majority chooses not to adopt a proposed dissenting
opinion, however, i.e., when the first audience conclusively rejects
the dissenter's point of view, the disagreeing judge must decide
whether to appeal to the second and third audiences, i.e., "higher"
and "lower" authority, respectively. Higher authority, if the origi-
nal appeal is to a federal circuit court panel of three judges, means
the in banc circuit court, the Supreme Court, or the appropriate
legislature; lower authority, the district courts and the bar. An ap-
peal to these audiences requires publication, 3 which means that all
the aforementioned attendant risks of dissent must be considered
and weighed against the possibility that the dissent will find an
approving audience.
Realistically, in most instances the possibility that the dissent
will find such an audience in the in banc circuit court, the Supreme
Court,3' or the appropriate legislature is remote. However, dissent
does seem to increase the odds that an opinion will be reversed or
otherwise overruled. For example, only three of the sixteen cases
the Second Circuit has decided in banc since 1980 were originally
decided by a unanimous three-judge panel.35 The presence of dis-
view to be the law. See Pound, supra note 25, at 794. As one judge has noted, the dissent is
not the place to publicize every doubt one has about a majority opinion: "if [I] dissented
every time [I] entertained a doubt, even a serious doubt, [I] would quite frequently dissent
from [my] own opinions." Evans, The Dissenting Opinion-Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo. L.
REv. 120, 120 n.lA (1938).
32 Justice Brennan has noted that "[lut is a common experience that dissents change
votes, even enough votes to become a majority." Brennan, Address, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama (Sept. 9, 1963), quoted in J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 13, at 193.
3 It is possible a circuit judge could refrain from publishing a dissent and yet appeal to
the in bane court via a request for a vote on a suggestion for a hearing in banc, accompanied
by an internal memorandum explaining the causes of the judge's discontent. But this is an
ineffective strategy when the ground for the in banc request is that "the proceeding involves
a question of exceptional importance," since one indication that a question is of exceptional
importance is the willingness of a judge to dissent from a perceived incorrect answer to the
question. The failure to dissent undercuts the urgency of the judge's request. For similar
reasons, it is also an ineffective strategy when the ground is that in banc consideration is
necessary to maintain decisional uniformity. See FED. R. App. P. 35.
" See Feinberg, supra note 11, at 369 (courts of appeals "operate as [courts] of last
resort in approximately ninety-nine percent of the cases they decide").
"3 Those three cases are Beauford v. Helmsley,'865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.) (in banc), va-
cated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1988) (in banc); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (in banc), vacated, 449
U.S. 1106 (1981). Cf. Sturgess, Federal Court Watch: Appellate Court Backs Stevens, Legal
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sent also seems to influence positively the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to grant certiorari,36 as well as the likelihood that the Su-
preme Court will reverse upon the merits.3 7 Additionally, even if
the dissent initially fails to persuade the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari, it may ultimately achieve indirectly the same end by
persuading another circuit that the dissent is correct, since conflict
among the circuits may attract the attention of the Court to a par-
ticular issue where conflict within a circuit has not.3s
Of course, in the latter instance, resolution of the particular
case that engendered the dissent remains unchanged; the battle
stays lost though the war is won. This also occurs when, as some-
times happens, a dissent influences the legislature to enact "correc-
tive" legislation. 9 While the losing party in the original appeal is
unlikely to derive much cheer from such a "victory," the more re-
moved perspective of the dissenting judge may allow for the deri-
vation of at least a modest degree of satisfaction.
A final possible benefit of dissent is that it can "emphasize the
limits of a majority decision that sweeps, so far as the dissent[] [is]
concerned, unnecessarily broadly-a sort of 'damage control'
mechanism. Along the same lines, a dissent sometimes is designed
to furnish litigants and lower courts with practical guidance-such
as ways of distinguishing subsequent cases."'4 0 Here, the targeted
audience-lower courts and litigants-constitutes a type of author-
ity whose lower status does not preclude it from exercising some
influence upon the decision-making of higher powers. Of course,
the scope of this influence is limited by the dictates of the majority
decision, but such influence may be felt where ambiguity exists. In
sum, to return to a previous analogy, even if the war, as well as the
battle, is lost, dissent can be viewed as beneficial in that it can lead
to the negotiation of a relatively favorable peace.4
Times, June 24, 1991, at 7 (noting it is unusual for District of Columbia Circuit to hear case
in banc in absence of panel dissent).
"' See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 339-40; Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen, The
Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111,
123-24 (G. Schubert ed. 1963); see also S. CT. R. 14.1(k)(i) (petitions for certiorari must
include copy of all prior opinions of "court whose decision is sought to be reviewed").
31 See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 340.
31 See S. CT. R. 10.1(a); see also W. REHNQUIST, supra note 29, at 265.
S9 See Carter, supra note 23, at 119.
"0 Brennan, supra note 5, at 430.
11 One problem with a dissent of this type is that the more convincingly it demon-
strates the limits of the majority decision, the less reason there is for a higher authority to
reverse or overrule the same.
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II. DISSENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS BEFORE 1891
A. The Supreme Court
Although the reasons for dissenting and for withholding dis-
sent have remained fairly stable since the establishment of the fed-
eral court system by the Constitution and the First Congress,
American judicial attitudes toward dissent have changed often. In
the beginning, dissent was the norm: "In most if not all of the
courts of last resort in this country, the judges originally expressed
their opinions seriatim; the dissents, of course, thereby always ap-
pearing."" This mode of decision-making-in which each judge
writes an opinion regardless of whether he or she agrees with the
court's judgment-was adopted from the English practice. That
practice, as favorably noted by Thomas Jefferson, allowed for seri-
atim opinions "in all but self-evident cases"."
The Supreme Court followed the English practice for most of
its first decade. During this period, "seriatim opinions were always
filed in important cases.""" The publication of each judge's individ-
ual opinion permitted the expression of variations in reasoning
rarely equalled since.45 Even today, while the Justices of the Su-
preme Court hardly can be said to exhibit an undue reluctance to
write separately, the institutional preference favors a single opin-
ion joined by all members of the Court, thereby discouraging, how-
ever slightly, the highlighting of all but fundamental disagree-
ments. In contrast, the early years of the Supreme Court were
marked by an institutional preference that encouraged the discus-
sion of even minute differences in reasoning.46 Since each Justice
was expected to write separately in each case, there was no induce-
ment to compromise.
The ascension of John Marshall to Chief Justice in 1801 ended
the practice of deciding cases by seriatim opinion. Instead, Chief
Justice Marshall persuaded the Court to allow one member of the
Court to speak for all, to deliver not merely the opinion of the in-
42 Simpson, supra note 20, at 207.
43 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (1822), quoted in J. SCHMIDHAUSER,
supra note 13, at 109.
44 ZoBell, supra note 5, at 192.
45 J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 13, at 107.
11 See, e.g., Georgia v. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). In Braislford, the first
case the Court decided by full opinion, all six Justices wrote opinions; the first opinion
published was a dissent. Id. at 405 (T. Johnson, J., dissenting).
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dividual justice but the opinion "of the Court." Not coincidentally,
the Justice most often chosen to deliver the opinion of the Court
was Chief Justice Marshall himself. During the period from 1801-
1804, for example, the Supreme Court decided twenty-six cases by
written opinion. Chief Justice Marshall authored the opinion of
the Court in twenty-four of these cases; in the other two, he re-
cused himself.47 Only one concurring opinion was written during
this time;48 there were no dissents.
At least during the early years of the Marshall Court, the an-
tipathy of the Justices toward dissenting opinions was intense. Jus-
tice William Johnson, appointed by Jefferson in 1804, wrote that
after his appointment,
[s]ome case soon occurred in which I differed from my breth-
ren, and I thought it a thing of course to deliver my opinion. But,
during the rest of the session I heard nothing but lectures on the
indecency of judges cutting at each other, and the loss of reputa-
tion which the Virginia appellate court had sustained by pursuing
such a course. At length I found that I must either submit to cir-
cumstances or become such a cypher in our consultations as to
effect no good at all. I therefore bent to the current .... 49
Even John Marshall's abundant persuasive powers, however,
ultimately were insufficient to maintain the extraordinarily strong
compunction against dissent exhibited by the Court during the
years 1801-1804. Indeed, yielding to the changing mores of the
Court, "Marshall himself eventually filed nine dissents. '50 But at
no time during his entire thirty-five-year tenure on the Court did
the decision to write separately assume the degree of ordinariness
it has today. Justice Story's view, which may be considered repre-
sentative of the views of the members of the Court during the lat-
ter years of the Marshall era,5' was disclosed in a letter to Court
J' j. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 13, at 111-12. Marshall's actual dominance was some-
what less complete than the figures given above indicate. The Chief Justice certainly was
open to modifying his personal view in order to achieve unanimity, even to the point of
writing opinions "contrary to his own judgment and vote." Letter from William Johnson to
Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in D.G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE
FIRST DISSENTER 182 (1954).
48 The concurrence was by Justice Chase in Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804).
"9 Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec 10, 1822), quoted in D.G.
MORGAN, supra note 47, at 182.
80 ZoBell, supra note 5, at 196.
The only Justice with a different view appears to have been Justice Johnson. See
generally D.G. MORGAN, supra note 47; Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme
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Reporter Henry Wheaton:
At the earnest suggestion (I will not call it by a stronger name) of
Mr. Justice Washington, I have determined not to deliver a .dis-
senting opinion in Olivera v. The United Insurance Company.
The truth is, I was never more entirely satisfied that any decision
was wrong, than that this is, but Judge Washington thinks (and
very correctly) that the habit of delivering dissenting opinions on
ordinary occasions weakened the authority of the Court, and is of
no public benefit. It is no small proof of my good nature, that I
have yielded in this instance, for since my return I have read
pretty fully on the subject, and am more and more convinced that
my original opinion was right.2
Similarly, in 1827, Chief Justice Marshall, indicating his reluctance
to write separately, described it as his "custom," when he dis-
agreed with the Court, to "acquiesce silently in its opinion. '5 3
Dissent on the Supreme Court increased with the appointment
of Roger Taney as Chief Justice in 1836. Occasionally, a decision of
the Taney Court would illustrate with stark clarity the extent of
the movement away from the persuasive unanimity of the early
years of the Marshall Court. In the Passenger Cases54 of 1849, for
example, a 5-4 vote yielded eight opinions. On the surface, the ex-
istence of such a decision suggests the ephemerality of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's influence over the Court's institutional norms. The
surface appearance of mere ephemeral influence is ostensible only,
however; the core truth is that Chief Justice Marshall's legacy in
this area is one of enduring influence. The bevy of opinions that so
distinguished the decision in the Passenger Cases as a rarity dur-
ing Chief Justice Taney's tenure would have marked it as a com-
monplace in the years before John Marshall became Chief Justice.
Cases in which the majority of Justices write separately remain a
rarity today. Chief Justice Marshall's legacy is thus not that he
eliminated dissent, but rather that by establishing the single ma-
jority opinion as the normal mode of decision, he encouraged a
practice of bargaining and compromise among the Justices, which
Court Leadership, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 785 (1975).
52 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 303-04 (W. Story ed. 1851).
" Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting); see also J. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCurT 39 (1987)
(noting silent acquiescence of Justice Livingston in 1819 decision of Supreme Court directly
contrary to decision by Justice Livingston while on circuit two years before).
4 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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thereafter has been characteristic of the Court's deliberations, and
which thereafter has worked to minimize dissent's incidence.
Of course, dissent has increased in the Supreme Court since
the time of John Marshall. The bulk of the increase, however, is a
twentieth century phenomenon. Justice Samuel Blatchford, for ex-
ample, who served on the Court from April 1882 to July 1893, au-
thored only two dissents during those eleven years.5 This rate of
dissent of fewer than one every five years (for an average of .18 per
year) was low for the time, and is inconceivably low by .the stan-
dards of today, when the most accommodating Justice still aver-
ages more than five dissents each year. 6 Even the first Justice
Harlan, however, who was known for his dissents, averaged only
approximately 3.45 per year during the same eleven-year period
from 1882 to 1893. Most of the other Justices averaged somewhere
in between .18 and 3.45 dissents per year.5
Thus, when the modern federal courts of appeals were estab-
lished in 1891, a Justice's individual expression of opinion had lost
some of the stigma that attached to it during the era of the Mar-
shall Court, but had not yet reached the degree of respectability
accorded to it by the members of the modern Court.5 One might
say that the collective attitude of the Justices toward separate
opinion writing had evolved incrementally from regarding separate
opinions as nearly conclusively illegitimate to regarding them with
a kind of permissive presumption of illegitimacy. The evolutionary
trend has continued in the century since 1891, to the point where
today, in the Supreme Court, it might be said that the only pre-
sumption is one favoring legitimacy absent strong evidence to the
contrary.59
J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 73.
66 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, 104 HARV. L. REv. 129, 359 (1990) (chart
indicating dissenting Justices); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARv. L. REV. 7, 362
(1987) (same).
" Fifteen Justices served on the Supreme Court from April 1882 to July 1893. During
this time, only Justices David J. Brewer and Henry B. Brown-who began service on the
Court in 1890 and 1891, respectively-dissented at a rate higher than that of Justice Harlan.
No Justice dissented at a rate lower than that of Justice Blatchford.
58 See generally Brennan, supra note 5 passim.
The history of dissent in the Supreme Court has been explored in detail in Percival
E. Jackson's Dissent in the Supreme Court (1969). That book notes dissent in the Supreme
Court remained low throughout John Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice. Id. at 40. After
Chief Justice Marshall left the Court, the frequency of dissent fluctuated up and down for
approximately the next 100 years, always at a higher rate than that of the Marshall Court,
but always too at a rate considerably lower than that of the present Court. See id. at 41, 96-
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B. The Lower Federal Courts
Federal intermediate appellate courts have existed since 1789.
However, the peculiar structure of the appellate system prior to
1891 discouraged the independent development of any institu-
tional preferences in the intermediate appellate courts for or
against separate opinion writing.
The first implementation of the Congressional authority to
"from time to time establish" lower federal courts60 became law on
September 24, 1789 when President Washington signed the Judici-
ary Act of 1789.61 That Act created thirteen district courts, each
with a single district judge, and three circuit courts. The circuit
courts were granted trial and appellate jurisdiction. 2 However, no
separate circuit judgeships were authorized at this time; the circuit
court was to consist of two Supreme Court Justices assigned to the
circuit plus the respective district judge.
The Judiciary Act of 18013 abolished the Justices' circuit-rid-
ing responsibilities, concomitantly creating the first separate cir-
cuit judgeships. The Act established six circuit courts, with New
York, Connecticut, and Vermont grouped together for the first
time as the Second Circuit. The incoming Jeffersonians repealed
the Federalist-sponsored 1801 Act 64 and passed their own version
of judicial reform in 1802.61 The later Act maintained the composi-
tion of the Second Circuit-New York, Connecticut, and Ver-
mont-but abolished the separate circuit court judgeships (all of
which had been filled by Federalists),6 and, with slight changes,
reinstituted the Justices' circuit-riding duties. Each Justice-there
were six at the time-was assigned to one of the six circuits. The
circuit court was composed of the circuit justice and the local dis-
97, 169, 175. A substantial increase in the rate of dissent began in the 1940's, and has been
maintained to this day. See id. at 221, 251; Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren Court,"
and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REv. 353, 355 (1968); see generally Harvard Law Re-
view's annual Supreme Court review, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, supra note 56,
at 359; The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107, 181 (1951).
60 U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1.
61 Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
62 The circuit courts were authorized to exercise appellate review over final decrees in
civil cases in which the sum in controversy exceeded fifty dollars and in admiralty and mari-
time cases in which the sum in controversy exceeded three-hundred dollars.
Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
Act of March 5, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
65 Act of April 29, 1802, 2 Stat. 118.
66 M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 41.
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trict judge. To lessen the hardships on the Justices-"the system is
commonly believed to have been fatal to Justices Wilson and
Iridell"67-Congress permitted the circuit court to be commenced
by a single district judge.
With some minor adjustments in response to the nation's geo-
graphic growth and an uneven growth in caseload, the system out-
lined above was maintained until 1869. For a number of reasons, it
is difficult to attribute to the circuit courts-then "the weak spot"
in the federal judiciary64-the development of any independent
culture of dissent.
To the extent the Supreme Court Justices participated in the
circuit courts' appellate work, it might be conceded that the circuit
courts' attitude toward dissent reflected the Supreme Court's atti-
tude. But other factors militate against this conclusion, and sug-
gest instead that rather than a derivative attitude, the circuit
courts developed no attitude at all.
As noted, the circuit court could be held by a single judge.
From the available evidence, it appears that it usually was.0 9 Obvi-
ously, this was not conducive to dissent-it is one of the few re-
maining unchallenged legal absolutes that every judge on a one-
judge tribunal will agree with the decision of the court. Moreover,
as the district judges could convene the circuit court on their own,
"the privilege of non-attendance came increasingly to be used by
the circuit justices." 70 "Correspondingly, circuit court review of
district court decisions became more and more frequently futile. 7 1
It is little wonder that lawyers preferred to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court.72 The confluence of these factors explains in large
part why only two dissenting opinions are recorded in the reported
decisions of the circuit court in the twenty-five years before the
Judiciary Act of 1869 became effective. 73 And the existence of
these factors counsels against viewing the rarity of dissent as con-
clusive of an institutional bias against dissent on par with that of
the Supreme Court during the early years of the Marshall Court.
11 C. HOUGH, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK 13 (1939).
" H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 38 (1953).
69 See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 44-45.
70 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 68, at 43.
71 Id.
72 C. HOUGH, supra note 67, at 31.
7. M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 46.
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The Judiciary Act of 1869 " established the first nationwide
separate circuit judgeships since the short-lived Federalist reform
of 1801 was repealed. However, the 1869 Act did little to develop a
culture of dissent in the circuit courts. First, the Act created only
nine circuit judgeships, one for each circuit.75 Second, it continued
the practice of allowing the circuit court to be held by a single cir-
cuit or district judge. Because the federal courts experienced a vast
surge in caseload after the Civil War,"6 the small number of new
judgeships that were created did little to discourage the wide-
spread utilization of the one-judge circuit court. Indeed, it is with
good reason that the period from 1869 to 1891 has been called the
"nadir of federal judicial administration." 7 It is, for example, in-
herently "unfriendly to impartial justice"78 to allow trial judges to
sit in judgment upon themselves. Yet, by one account, "[b]y the
late 1880's, eight-ninths of the litigation in the circuit courts was
disposed of by a single judge sitting alone: the district judge. 7 9
"[N]ot from Philip drunk to Philip sober," has such a right of ap-
peal been characterized, "but from Philip sober to Philip intoxi-
cated with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a
published decision." 80 And even when the trial judge did not sit in
review of himself, the "circuit court was almost always conducted
by a single judge.""1
The Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,82 known as the Ev-
arts Act,83 corrected these deficiencies. The Act created a new tier
74 Act of April 10, 1869, 16 Stat. 44.
7' To deal with the most extensive backlog of cases in the circuit courts, Congress au-
thorized a second judge for the Second Circuit in 1887. M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 50-51.
7' There were numerous reasons for the increase. First, several statutes increased the
business of the federal courts, e.g., the post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1867, and the Removal Act of 1875. "There were economic causes for the caseload explo-
sion as well .... Litigation was stimulated by industrial development, railroad building, the
marketing of goods, the settlement of the public domain, and the economic penetration of
the Northwest and Southwest." J. MoRIus, supra note 53, at 69.
7 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 68, at 45.
71 Letter from the Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Congress (Nov. 7,
1792), in 1 AtmiucAN STATE PAPERS (CLASS X) MISCELLANEOUS 51-52.
79 J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 70; see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 6 (4th ed.
1983).
8o Hill, The Federal Judicial System, 12 A.B.A. REP. 289, 304, quoted in J. MORRIS,
supra note 53, at 70.
'z M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 47; see J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 93.
62 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826.
83 The Act was named after the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, William
Evarts of New York.
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of appellate courts, the Circuit Courts of Appeal,84 the structure of
which allowed dissent, for the first time, a realistic opportunity to
flourish in a federal intermediate appellate court. Under the terms
of the Act, two judges were required to establish a quorum, and
the practice of allowing trial judges to review their own judgments
was eliminated.8 5 The current appellate system dates from the pas-
sage of the Evarts Act, and has remained substantially unchanged
since its creation in 1891.86
III. DISSENT IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT, 1891-1991
A. 1891-1941
The inaugural sitting of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was held on June 16, 1891.87 An era of good feelings pre-
vailed until October 4, 1892, when Judge William J. Wallace issued
the new court's first dissent in In re H.B. Claflin Co.,8" a customs
case which turned on the meaning of the words "hemmed
84 In 1948, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals were renamed the United States
Courts of Appeals. Since the change was one in name only, to facilitate ease of expression
and to maintain continuity of expression, with the single exception of the text accompany-
ing this note, the modern nomenclature is used throughout this Article with regard to both
the 1891-1948 and post-1948 periods. See Barron, The Judicial Code: 1948 Revision, 8
F.R.D. 439, 441 (1949). The same 1948 revision also redesignated the office of "Senior Cir-
cuit Judge" "Chief Judge." See id.; see also infra note 148.
8 M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 52 & n.45. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was authorized three judges; the other circuits, two. Id. District judges and Supreme Court
Justices were also eligible to sit on the new court. J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 93; see also
C. WRIGHT, supra note 79, at 6.
The Evarts Act also eliminated the appellate jurisdiction of the old circuit courts. M.
SCHICK, supra note 8, at 52-53. Those courts were finally abolished in 1911. Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. In the interim, they acted as trial courts, "indistin-
guishable in actual operation from the district courts." J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 93.
88 Carrington, supra note 16, at 542.
The history of the federal intermediate appellate court in the District of Columbia dif-
fers substantially from the history given hereinabove. In the District of Columbia, a three-
judge circuit court, established in 1801, was abolished during the Civil War amidst uncer-
tainty as to the strength of its judges' loyalty to the Union. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 13,
at 46. At the time of its abolishment, all three circuit judges also served as district judges.
Id. at 129. The circuit court was replaced by a new court called the Supreme Court for the
District of Columbia, which itself was replaced as an appellate court in 1893 by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. at 46.
8 j. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 94.
88 52 F. 121 (2d Cir. 1892). The first concurrence was filed on February 16, 1892. See
Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Bowring, 50 F. 613, 616 (2d Cir. 1892) (Lacombe, J.,
concurring).
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handkerchiefs." Judge Wallace's dissent was short-a single para-
graph-and had only one citation. In this regard, it proved to be
typical of the dissents in the early years of the court of appeals.
The next year, 1893, was the first full year in which the court
possessed its authorized complement of three judges. Three dis-
sents were filed in 1893,89 perhaps leading some to conclude that
by issuing the court's single dissent of 1892, Judge Wallace had in
effect opened the floodgates; after all, the following year dissent
tripled! History fails to support such a view, however; ten years
later, in 1903, the yearly total still numbered three. As before, the
dissents generally were short and relatively free of citation. Indeed,
only one of the dissents filed in 1903 contained any citations at
all.90
The fact that the level of dissent remained low through 1903
suggests that a strong bias against dissent existed during the early
years of the court. The inference assumes increased persuasiveness
once it is realized that while membership on the court remained
the same from 1892 until 1902, in 1902 two new judges were added
after one judge retired and one additional judgeship was author-
ized for the court. That the level of dissent remained stable after
the change in the court's composition tends to suggest that the
high rate of cohesion during the court's first decade was not so
much an anomaly resulting from the chance existence of atypically
high degrees of congruent thinking and passivity among the judges
as the result of a conscious search for consensus and a conscious
suppression of disagreement.
In the next decade in the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, by now the busiest court of appeals, the incidence of dissent
increased, although by the standards of today it was still low. The
"great dissenter" on the court during this period, for example,
Judge Walter C. Noyes, dissented only twelve times from 1907 to
1913.91 Dissents were still short; six of the nine dissents filed in
'9 See Sanders v. Palmer, 55 F. 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1893) (Shipman, J., dissenting); Hower
v. Weiss Malting & Elevator Co., 55 F. 356, 359 (2d Cir. 1893) (Wallace, J., dissenting);
Arnold v. Chesebrough, 58 F. 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1893) (Wheeler, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
154 U.S. 493 (1894).
90 See In re The Germanic, 124 F. 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1903) (Wallace, J., dissenting), aff'd sub
nom. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Aitken, 196 U.S. 589 (1905). The two dissents with-
out citation were United States v. Baltic Mills Co., 124 F. 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1903) (Coxe, J.,
dissenting) and Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict v. Howe Scale Co. of 1886, 122 F. 348, 354
(2d Cir. 1903) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 198 U.S. 118 (1905).
J1 . MorRS, supra note 53, at 94 n.*.
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1913 had no citations whatsoever. Analysis of the courts' 1923
opinions reveals a substantially similar picture.
It is impossible to state with certainty why dissent became
and stayed somewhat more common in the two decades after 1903.
The increase may be attributable in part to changes in the court's
membership. Some of the increase is probably a result of changes
in the subject matter of cases that came before the court. From
1891 to the 1920's, that subject matter became increasingly unfa-
miliar, as the "federal courts were transformed from courts dealing
primarily with admiralty, diversity cases, and a few federal special-
ties, into courts with a heavy public law docket consisting of a
much increased criminal business and many cases involving gov-
ernment regulation of the economy."92
Another probable reason for the increase in dissent is that as
the courts of appeals grew in stature from experiments needing to
prove themselves to courts whose value had been proved through
experience, the judges accorded less weight to the danger posed by
dissent to the courts' institutional prestige. Such a phenomenon
would not have been unprecedented; it is what occurred in the Su-
preme Court after John Marshall successfully established that
Court as a potent and independent national force in the early
1800's. The institution being less vulnerable, the cautions appro-
priate to a more vulnerable era appear correspondingly less attrac-
tive. That the courts of appeals did grow in stature and, accord-
ingly, became less vulnerable during these years is beyond dispute;
the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925"s stands as tangible evi-
dence of this. The 1925 Act, popularly known as the Judges' Bill,
through the use of the writ of certiorari allowed the Supreme
Court for the first time to exercise significant control over its own
docket."4 The passage of the Judges' Bill "signified that the Courts
of Appeals had come of age and could be trusted as the final forum
for all but a very few classes of cases in public law." 95 The in-
creased confidence in the courts of appeals that such a law re-
flected could hardly have developed overnight, and could hardly
92 Id. at 94.
11 43 Stat. 936.
" The process begun in 1925 has continued throughout the decades since, the most
recent evidence being the passage of Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, on June 27, 1988.
See, e.g., Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252
(West Supp. 1991).
" J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 120.
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have gone unnoticed by the courts' judges.
The core of the court that was later widely recognized as the
United States' strongest joined the Second Circuit between 1924
and 1929, with the additions to the court of Learned Hand,
Thomas Swan, Augustus Hand, and, in the newly established fifth
seat, Harrie B. Chase.96 In absolute numbers, dissent increased
during the early years of this court, but at least the bulk of the
increase was more a function of the court's increased caseload of
the 1930's than any increased proclivity toward dissent.97
The most notable change during this time was in the fre-
quency with which dissents contained citations. This change may
be attributed largely to Congress's 1930 authorization of a law
clerk for court of appeals judges.98 Then, as now, law clerks were
recruited mainly from the ranks of law review alumni, who, as a
group, have been trained to greet the unsupported statement with
the kind of revulsion most others reserve for the sound of finger-
nails screeching along a blackboard. Especially in the days before
the widespread availability of computerized research services and
the proliferation of specialized reporters, a judge burdened with a
heavy caseload was unlikely to develop much of a habit for search-
ing out precise authority for statements he knew to be true; this
was a consequence of prioritization, however, not distaste for ap-
propriate citation. The proof is in the opinions themselves. Before
1930, the absence of citation in dissents was common, perhaps
even the norm. After the judges were given the luxury of an assis-
tant trained in and inclined toward providing citation, however, ci-
tation in dissents very quickly became the norm, so much so that
by 1940, only one of twenty-eight dissents was completely devoid
of cites. 9
B. 1941-1991
The arrival of Charles Clark and Jerome Frank upon the now
six-member Second Circuit in 1939 and 1941, respectively, began
an unprecedented era of frequent dissent. During the years 1941-
51, the six judges on the court averaged approximately five pub-
O The fifth member of the court was Martin T. Manton, who resigned in disgrace in
1939. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
7 See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 65.
" Act of June 17, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-373, 46 Stat. 774.
" That dissent was authored by Judge Chase in Heenehan v. Prudence Realization
Corp., 108 F.2d 103, 104 (2d Cir. 1940).
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lished dissents per judge per year. 100 This figure was high for the
time, and is still high for today. The six judges of the Second Cir-
cuit who were active from 1981 through 1990,101 for example, aver-
aged slightly less than three dissents per year during that ten-year
period. It should also be noted that the six judges of the Second
Circuit who were on active status from 1981 through 1990 dis-
sented at a slightly greater rate than their colleagues who were ac-
tive during only a portion of this period.
What accounts for the markedly favorable attitude toward dis-
sent possessed by the judges of the Second Circuit during the
1940's and early 1950's? One reason is the presence of judges with
personalities more inclined toward dispute than accommodation.
Judges Clark and Frank surely must be categorized as such, as
must, to a slightly lesser degree, Judge Learned Hand. But, as will
be discussed below, undoubtedly contributing to the pronounced
natural inclination of these judges was the relative weakness of the
considerations that ordinarily restrain dissent. This combination of
personality and circumstance created an atmosphere unusually tol-
erant of dissent. This atmosphere permeated the Second Circuit,
was breathed in by all the judges, and can be expected to have
affected them all, even the judges inclined toward conciliation and
accommodation.
The most persuasive evidence such an atmosphere existed is
the frequency with which dissents were filed. Confirming evidence
can be found in statements by the judges explicitly recognizing
that dissent was in the air. For example, in 1946, Judge Swan com-
mented in an internal memorandum that "[i]n the manner of disa-
greement, this court is getting regrettably like its superior in
Washington.' 10 2 Judge Swan had been on the Second Circuit since
1927; his comment additionally implies that the judges of the Sec-
ond Circuit previously had not been so quick to dissent. Tellingly,
Judge Swan's remark was occasioned by his own preparation of a
dissenting opinion,' and generated the following response from
an unpersuaded Judge Clark: "I do not feel badly about the num-
"0o See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 315.
101 Namely, Chief Judge Oakes (1971) and Judges Feinberg (1966), Meskill (1975),
Newman (1979), Kearse (1979), and Cardamone (1981) (year of appointment to Second Cir-
cuit in parentheses).
102 Memorandum from Thomas Swan to Charles Clark (Nov. 29, 1946), quoted in M.
SCHICK, supra note 8, at 109-10.
103 M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 109.
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her of dissents, but think we are now only hitting our stride. In-
deed, when on the first week's cases we all concurred in everything,
I was distressed for fear we had gone soft."'104 Later Judge Clark
referred to the court's "tradition of slugging it out."'01 5 That tradi-
tion was acknowledged in a 1957 survey of appellate courts in
which the Second Circuit was alone in indicating that dissent was
"encouraged."' 106 One member of that 1957 court later expressed
the opinion that dissents were "a sign of health and vigor.' 0 7 To
be sure, not all of the judges of the Second Circuit during the
1940's and 1950's would have been inclined to agree with such an
opinion, but even the judges less enamored of dissent generally
were not openly hostile to the practice, as "long as [it] did not
unduly delay the administrative process of the Second Circuit."' 08
Once it is accepted as true that the judges of the Second Cir-
cuit were unusually open to dissent during the 1940's and 1950's
(and the statistics make the proposition difficult to contest), the
obvious question to ask becomes "why?" As noted, one reason may
be found in the personalities of the judges of the court. Another
reason is that the considerations that typically act to restrain the
impulse to dissent were, under the circumstances, simply not
persuasive.
As discussed in Part I, the considerations that tend to temper
the impulse to dissent are founded mainly upon (1) a concern for a
court's prestige and (2) a concern for a court's efficiency. As far as
prestige is concerned, however, "the general contemporary impres-
sion [was] that the [Second Circuit] court of appeals from 1941 to
1951 .. . was the strongest court in the United States."'0 9 Judge
Henry Friendly noted that "five of the six judges [of the 1941-51
court] were men of outstanding ability, in analytical power, legal
learning, general culture, and the ability to write graceful and pow-
'" Memorandum from Charles Clark to Thomas Swan (Nov. 30, 1946), quoted in M.
SCHICK, supra note 8, at 110 n.100.
105 Memorandum from Charles Clark to John M. Harlan (May 4, 1954), quoted in M.
ScHIcK, supra note 8, at 109.
'0' M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 109.
107 Medina, Some Reflections on the Judicial Function at the Appellate Level, 1961
WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 150.
108 See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 243.
... J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 123; see Wyzanski, Augustus Noble Hand, 61 HARv. L.
REV. 573, 573 (1948) (Second Circuit called "the ablest court now sitting"); Kurland, Jerome
N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 661
(1957); Frank, The Top U.S. Commercial Court, FORTUNE 92 (Jan. 1951).
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erful English, superior to all but a few judges in the land, including
the nine in Washington who reviewed their decisions." 110 Judge
Friendly's view is in accord with the prevailing view today; more
importantly, for our purposes, it was also the prevailing view at the
time the court was sitting. After 1951, with death and retirement
taking some of its most luminous figures,"' the prestige of the
court declined, but the decline was neither sudden nor
substantial." 2
A member of such an eminently prestigious court, especially
-during the period it was widely recognized as the nation's strong-
est, obviously would feel less compunction about dissent based
upon a fear of damaging institutional prestige than would a mem-
ber of a court of inferior status. Courts, like institutions in general,
are capable of unity in the face of a clear and present danger, but
the less apparently imminent the crisis, the less likely it is that
members of the threatened institution will unite. As far as prestige
is concerned, during the 1940's and 1950's, the Second Circuit was
a remarkably secure institution, substantially more so even than
the passage of the Judges' Bill indicated the courts of appeals in
general were secure. Thus, a realistic appraisal of the damage a
dissent might do to the court's prestige would provide little incen-
tive not to dissent. The court was not oblivious to the damage pro-
miscuous dissent could cause to its authority and prestige; it's just
that with dissent, as with other matters, one's ideas as to what con-
stitutes promiscuity tend to change as the costs associated with
such conduct are lessened or removed. In sum, the prestige of the
Second Circuit during the 1940's and 1950's to a large extent im-
munized it against the dangers of dissent; the judges were aware of
this, and, as a group, acted accordingly.
A concern for court efficiency is the second important impedi-
110 Friendly, 86 POL. Sci. Q. 470, 471 (1971). The Washington nine-Justices, not Sena-
tors-were also known around the Second Circuit as, among other things, The Jolly Boys,
Cherubim and Seraphim, the Nine Tin Jesuses, and the Nine Blessed Chalices of the Sacred
Effluvium. M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 142.
" Judge Learned Hand retired from active service in 1951, but continued to sit as a
senior judge until his death ten years later. Judge Swan served in active status until 1953,
and in senior status until 1965. Judge Augustus Hand died in 1954, after serving in senior
status for one year. Judge Chase retired the same year, and thereafter declined .to sit as
senior judge, except for a brief period during the late 1950's. Judge Clark remained on active
status until his death in 1963. Judge Frank, who died in 1957, was also on active status at
the time of his death.
12 J. MoRRs, supra note 53, at 123, 165.
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ment to frequent dissent. This concern too, however, provided lit-
tle reason for the members of the court during the 1940's and early
1950's to decrease their high rate of dissent. Although the Second
Circuit "was faced with the heaviest caseload of any of the inter-
mediate federal courts, it regularly disposed of its business more
quickly than did any of the other courts."11 3 The high rate of dis-
sent, of course, slowed down the court to some extent, but since it
was extremely efficient notwithstanding that high rate, the fre-
quent use of dissent was unlikely to be viewed as a luxury the
court could not afford. Adding to this perception was the fact that
because of a unique internal practice of the Second Circuit-the
preparation of voting memoranda""4-it often took less additional
effort for the Second Circuit's judges to dissent than would have
been required elsewhere. Thus, with neither of the primary disin-
centives to dissent providing persuasive reasons for reducing the
Second Circuit's rate of dissent during the 1940's and early 1950's,
it is not surprising that the rate of dissent remained consistently
high.
This most ideal environment for dissent did not long survive
Learned Hand's retirement from active status in 1951, as soon af-
terward began a nearly continuous trend of almost two decades'
duration toward an increasing backlog of pending cases.11 5 Not-
withstanding this less than ideal environment, dissent continued to
flourish. Numerous reasons may be offered in explanation of this
phenomenon.
First, a certain inertial force influences the behavior of institu-
113 M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 351-52. The record is remarkable, but not surprising.
First, all the judges of the court were diligent. Second, three members of the court were
extremely prolific writers (Judges L. Hand, Clark, and Frank); the others were noted for
their straight-to-the-point style of opinion-writing and relatively infrequent resort to dissent
(Judges Swan, A. Hand, and Chase). See id. at 97, 315. Finally, the court was immensely
experienced; by 1951, its judges averaged 20 years of service on the federal appellate bench.
114 Id. at 96. In the words of Judge Feinberg.
For those cases that the panel, after argument, agrees should be decided by opin-
ion rather than by summary order, it is customary to exchange voting memoranda.
These "voting memos" set out the particular judge's vote as well as the reasons for
that vote. Voting memos are extremely useful for the purpose of discussion at the
voting conferences held after the cases are heard; the memos also benefit the even-
tual opinion writer, who weeks later has in written form valuable suggestions
about the reasoning of an opinion, as well as cogent statements of a colleague's
concerns.
Feinberg, supra note 11, at 386 n.104. See Medina, Foreward: The "Old" Second Circuit in
1951, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1979).
'" M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 68.
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tions, as well as individuals. Thus, the Second Circuit's "tradition
of slugging it out" favored continued frequent use of the dissent, as
did the fact that the most ardent individual followers of this tradi-
tion tended to outstay their less disputatious colleagues in terms of
service on the court."'
Second, the legal community's regard for the Second Circuit
remained high, a fact which may have tended to moderate any im-
pulse toward reducing the incidence of dissent that the increased
backlog of cases otherwise might have caused.
Third, certain new developments on the court, authorized by
Congress, may have discouraged restraint. Comparative perform-
ance sometimes being the enemy of optimal performance, the in-
crease in 1961 of the court's size from six to nine judges made re-
straint appear less important because it allowed the court to
increase its output without reducing its rate of dissent, and
thereby held out the hope that the court could reduce its backlog
without changing its pattern of dissent. The addition in 1969 of a
second law clerk to the staffs of federal appellate judges may have
had a similar effect, by allowing the judges to increase their indi-
vidual outputs without reducing their individual rates of dissent.
Fourth, in terms of efficiency, the continued use of voting
memoranda continued to make the decision to dissent less costly in
the Second Circuit than elsewhere. Accordingly, a reduction in dis-
sent as a means of achieving increased efficiency appeared corre-
spondingly less attractive.
Finally, the magnitude of the problem indicated that the solu-
tion was not in greater judicial self-control. Between 1950 and
1969, the number of cases docketed in the Second Circuit in-
creased fourfold." 7 To suggest that limiting dissent might solve the
problems caused by such an increase in caseload is akin to sug-
gesting that in order to decrease the force of impact, the passen-
gers on an airplane plummeting uncontrollably to the ground
should discard all unnecessary items. In both cases, even full im-
plementation would only prove the inadequacy of the proposed
solution.
The accumulation of these factors limited the potential ability
of the developing backlog of pending cases to substantially depress
116 Proving that the meaning of a word is always context-dependent, our "nontradition-
alists" in this instance are Augustus Hand and Harrie B. Chase, each of whom left the court
in 1954.
.1. M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 68.
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the Second Circuit's rate of dissent. One survey of the federal cir-
cuit courts, for example, indicated that during the 1962-1964
terms, the Second Circuit was more prone to dissent than all but
the District of Columbia Circuit.118 Slowly, however, as the bur-
dens of a heavy caseload came to be viewed more as a permanent
fixture than a temporary aberration, the tradition of slugging it out
came to be viewed somewhat less favorably. Evidence of this
changed view can be seen in the reluctance to hear cases in banc
that developed in the late 1960's after a brief period of relatively
frequent resort to the practice.111 Also evidencing this change is
the occasional inclusion of self-conscious justifying language within
a dissent, such as then-Judge Thurgood Marshall's assurance that
"[w]ith deference to my brothers, I deem the issues raised by the
present case to be of such importance that a statement of my dis-
senting views is necessary. '120 The obvious implication, of course,
128 Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968
Wis. L. REV. 461, 464.
119 During the Chief Judgeship of Learned Hand, the practice of the Second Circuit was
"never to sit in banc." Lopinsky v. Hertz-Ur-Self Sys., Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
Soon after Judge Clark, long a frustrated advocate of the in banc hearing, became Chief
Judge in 1954, the practice changed, Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 312 F.2d 893, 893
(1963), so much so that in 1962 the court decided eleven cases in banc. See id. at 896. The
result was disenchantment with the in banc procedure, even among its former adherents. M.
SCHICK, supra note 8, at 122. Over time, this disenchantment coalesced into a firm suspicion
as to the utility of the process: "My view, and that of my predecessor [as Chief Judge],
Irving R. Kaufman, is that for the most part in bancs are not a good idea: They consume an
enormous amount of time and often do little to clarify the law." Feinberg, supra note 11, at
376-77; see also Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976) (in banc)
(denial of petition for rehearing in banc stating in banc procedure is "often an unwieldy and
cumbersome device generating little more than delay, costs, and continued uncertainty that
can ill be afforded at a time of burgeoning calendars"), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
297, 311-12 (1986). The colleagues of Judges Kaufman and Feinberg apparently share-and
for some time have shared-the same view. See Newman, supra note 10, at 369; Newman,
supra note 18, at 382.
120 Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 42 (1962) (Marshall,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963). The tenor of such comments is reminiscent
of the following remarks by Justice Story, delivered at a time when dissent was decidedly
ill-favored:
It is [a] matter of regret that... I have the misfortune to differ from a majority of
the Court, for whose superior learning and ability I entertain the most entire re-
spect .... Had this been an ordinary case I should have contented myself with
silence; but believing that no more important or interesting question ever came
before a prize tribunal, and that the national rights, suspended on it, are of infi-
nite moment to the maritime world, I have thought it not unfit to pronounce my
own opinion ....
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 455 (1815) (Story, J., dissenting).
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is that in most cases in which one disagrees with the majority a
statement of one's dissenting views is not necessary. The atmos-
phere, it seems, was no longer so "encouraging" of dissent.121
The changed atmosphere, however-changed at least in part
due to the court's crushing caseload-did not immediately bring
about an appreciable decline in the number of dissents. Instead,
the court attempted to increase its efficiency by a variety of pro-
grams and procedures whose adoption was perhaps less painful
than reducing dissent's incidence. This variety included such sim-
ple timesaving devices as increasing the number of oral decisions
and unpublished summary orders. The increased utilization of dis-
trict court and senior circuit judges also helped to expedite case
flow, as did the creation in 1971 of the position of circuit executive,
which, among other things, relieved the chief judge of the circuit of
some administrative duties.
The most ambitious and innovative program was the Civil Ap-
peals Management Plan ("CAMP"), designed by then-Chief Judge
Irving R. Kaufman and instituted under his leadership in 1974.122
CAMP aims to expedite case flow first by encouraging settlement
and compromise, and, if that fails, by clarifying the issues on ap-
peal. It also allows minor procedural issues to be disposed of by
staff counsel without the expenditure of judicial resources. 123
The number and range of these remedies, 24 adopted over the
course of more than a decade, indicates the seriousness with which
the court viewed its case backlog. The fact that so many remedies
were needed also illustrates the near intractability of the problem.
121 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
122 See generally A. PARTRIDGE & A. LINN, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MAN-
AGEMENT PLAN passim (1983); Kaufman, supra note 18, passim. The Plan to Expedite the
Processing of Criminal Appeals, instituted under Chief Judge Lumbard's leadership, also
deserves mention, both as a foreruner of CAMP, and as an additional means adopted by the
court to increase its efficiency. See J. MORRIS, supra note 53, at 170-71.
122 See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 756.
12'4 The court's "sixty-day list," begun when Judge Lumbard was Chief Judge, also is
regarded as an effective device for expediting the resolution of cases. See, e.g., Feinberg,
supra note 11, at 385; Second Circuit Newsletter 3 (Winter 1990). "This is a list of cases
undecided sixty days after argument or submission [which] is examined case by case at each
meeting of the court of appeals." Feinberg, supra note 11, at 385. The examination consists
of the judge assigned to write the opinion explaining what stage the opinion is at, and pre-
dicting the date it will be circulated to the other judges on the panel. On a court so keenly
aware of the state of its docket, the subtle coercive effect of such an examination is obvious.
See Oakes, supra note 27, at 710 ("judges can... be embarrassed at having too many cases
on the 60-Day List"); Feinberg, supra note 119, at 313 (noting that, due to "peer-pressure,"
filings of opinions increase immediately before each meeting).
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Finally, in the mid-1970's, the court began to reduce its backlog,
still without any substantial decline in dissent. By the early 1980's,
however, as the court continued to struggle to keep pace with its
ever-expanding docket, a reduction in dissent became evident. 125
In part, this reduction probably was due to the predilections
of the new members of the court. Not all the decrease, however,
can be so attributed. For example, Judge Feinberg and Chief Judge
James L. Oakes-the only judges who served in active status from
1971 to 1990-each dissented approximately twice as often from
1971 to 1980 as from 1981 to 1990. These statistics are made par-
ticularly striking by the fact that, as Chief Judge Oakes and Judge
Feinberg are generally viewed as moderate to liberal judges, one
might have expected the frequency of their dissent to increase dur-
ing a time the court became, with seven Reagan appointees, in-
creasingly conservative. 2 ' Clearly, something in addition to a
change in the court's membership was at work; the old tradition of
slugging it out finally gave way to a new tradition of increased
compromise and acquiescence.
Such a change is in accord with the belief that concerns for
court efficiency tend to weaken the impulse to dissent. Still unex-
plained, however, is why the effect, which lagged so far behind its
cause, finally manifested itself. The earlier discussion of five possi-
ble reasons why, during the 1960's, the cause and effect were not
more closely linked 27 provides the basis for a comparison that may
prove instructive.
First, the inertial force of tradition that had earlier favored a
high rate of dissent simply weakened. "[T]radition[s] may wither,"
Judge Feinberg has reminded us. 28 Faced with the continuing fric-
tion of a large caseload, the Second Circuit tradition of encourag-
ing dissent did wither, but slowly. Old traditions die hard, after all;
it is thus not unexpected that the effect did not clearly manifest
itself until the 1980's.
Second, as court administration became increasingly a matter
of concern for judges and litigants alike, the prestige of a court
increasingly became identified with its reputation for administra-
125 Compare M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 313 with Feinberg, supra note 119, at 300.
12 Judges Kaufman, Timbers, Van Graafeiland, and Meskill-all of whom maintained
active status throughout much of the 1970's and 1980's-also dissented considerably less
often in the latter decade.
127 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
128 Feinberg, supra note 11, at 386.
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tive efficiency. 129 Thus, the prestige of the Second Circuit earned
independently of its reputation for efficiency became less able to
provide a persuasive reason not to withhold dissent than it did
previously.
Third, hard experience taught the court that it approached
the chimerical to imagine that Congress, by increasing the number
of judgeships or clerkships, or by any other action, might allow the
court to carry on as before. Congress generally-and the general-
ization held true in this case-is reactive, not proactive; it may
throw a life preserver to a court drowning in its backlog, but it is
unlikely to act affirmatively to reduce the flood tide of new cases
coming the court's way. Certainly by the 1980's it had become
much clearer than before that unless the court was content to peri-
odically risk drowning, it had better swim straight for shore in-
stead of spending time treading water, arguing.
Fourth, as decades passed, the use of the voting memorandum
became less common. Today, only a minority of Second Circuit
judges-when presiding on a panel-regularly request voting
memos from their colleagues. As the tradition of exchanging voting
memoranda became less a rule than a well-respected exception, 130
the decision to dissent became more costly in terms of efficiency
than it was when voting memoranda were more customarily
exchanged.
Finally, by 1980, the Second Circuit had established a record
of each year decreasing its backlog of cases. 31 Somewhat paradoxi-
cally, this record made a reduction in dissent more attractive as a
means-of increasing court efficiency than it was during the 1960's,
when a reduced backlog was only slightly more likely to occur on
the court than a balanced budget was likely to emerge from Con-
gress. The achievement of regularly, albeit sometimes minimally,
reducing the court's backlog of pending cases became a point of
pride among the judges; consequently, the achievement created
enormous internal pressures to repeat the success. A baseball
pitcher once commented that he was glad never to have won
twenty games during a season, since then "they'd expect it every
129 See Special Session, supra note 16, at 5-6 (remarks of Harold R. Tyler, Jr.); id. at
20 (remarks of Chief Judge Kaufman).
230 For a listing of some reasons for the decline in the use of voting memoranda, see
Oakes, supra note 27, at 704. In that article, Chief Judge Oakes terms the decline "an unfor-
tunate loss."
' Special Session, supra note 16, passim.
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year." In the 1970's, the Second Circuit, in effect, made the mis-
take of winning twenty games year after year. And, as the pitcher
might have predicted, an achievement that was once characterized
by Chief Justice Burger as a "near miracle[]"'132 quickly became
the expected. In such an environment, on a court that had always
remained generally collegial, the relatively minor increase in effi-
ciency a decrease in dissent could bring assumed a potential im-
portance greater than that it had previously possessed, in the same
way an additional victory by a pitcher with nineteen wins is com-
monly imbued with much more significance than an additional vic-
tory by a pitcher with eighteen wins. 33 In sum, once the court
gained control of its spiraling docket, following a struggle that
lasted well over a decade, its awareness of the fragility of this hard-
won victory13 ' appears to have convinced it that almost every
weapon at its disposal 35 must be used in order to maintain such
control, including refraining from dissent. In such a context, the
appropriate analogy regarding the efficacy of reducing dissent be-
comes not to passengers aboard a plummeting airplane, but to
sailors aboard an otherwise seaworthy ship that has begun slowly
to take on water. In contrast to before, the crew of the Second
Circuit seems to have concluded, reasonably and almost unani-
mously, that constant discard of unnecessary items, such as the
luxury item of frequent dissent, may allow them to keep perma-
132 Id. at 24.
133 See N.Y. Times, October 4, 1990, at D26, col.2 (St. John's alumnus Frank Viola
changes mind and decides to pitch in meaningless last game of season in order to gain twen-
tieth win). The following comments by Chief Judge Oakes are reflective of the court's desire
to "win twenty" every year:
We have had a process in the Second Circuit known as "clearing the calendar." It
started, I believe, when Irving Kaufman was Chief Judge and was continued
throughout Wilfred Feinberg's tenure. It means that we decide more cases each
year than were filed. If this sounds like an anomaly, it is not; we have actually
reduced our backlog of cases each year in this fashion for some years .... [T]he
process is a worthwhile one which, if it does not become the sole aim of the court,
should nevertheless be a regular one.
Oakes, supra note 27, at 710.
134 The precariousness of the court's control was convincingly demonstrated in the
1988-89 and 1989-90 Terms, during which the court's backlog expanded by nearly 400 cases.
After implementing additional remedial measures-primarily extra sitting days for the
court's judges and extra cases heard at each sitting-the 1990-91 Term saw a return to the
norm, with the court disposing of 119 more appeals than were filed during the judicial year.
Wise, Circuit Courts Backlog Cut by 10 Percent, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
"I The notable exception is the opportunity for oral argument; the Second Circuit is
alone in offering that opportunity to every litigant (except incarcerated pro se litigants). See
United States v. Delia, 925 F.2d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1991) (one-judge motion).
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nently their heads above water, and not merely delay slightly an
inevitable crash.
This more accepting attitude toward restraint in dissent is
likely to prevail in the Second Circuit as long as caseload pressures
remain high. A recent opinion by Judge Newman indicates the
pride the court takes in its status as perhaps the most efficient
court:
Like most courts, this Court is experiencing an increase in
filings and is struggling to keep pace. We have obliged ourselves
to take on extra panel assignments in order to handle our volume.
For years, this Court, through the efforts of its judges and the
cooperation of the bar, has led the courts of appeals of this coun-
try in avoiding or at least holding to a minimum the growth of a
backlog and in maintaining the lowest median time from filing of
appeals to disposition. We strive to maintain the pace for which
this Court is highly regarded, not to value speed for its own sake,
but in the firm conviction that once backlogs are permitted to
develop, they tend to increase, with consequent impairment of
the overall functioning of the court system. 3 6
That these words were written in response to a motion seeking
a one-month delay in the due date of an appellant's brief indicates
the seriousness with which even minor delays are viewed, and sug-
gests that the delays necessarily occasioned by dissent are likely to
continue to depress dissent's incidence within the Second Circuit.
Eternal vigilance, the court now seems convinced, is the price of
efficiency.
IV. THE PROOF OF THE MOTIVE IS IN THE WRITING: TYPES OF
DISSENT AND THE MOTIVES THEY REVEAL
As discussed earlier in Part I.B., dissents perform various posi-
tive functions. By far the most important of these is the ability of
a dissent to influence the development of the law; this may be
called dissent's persuasive function. Dissent also performs a pro-
phylactic function, with the possibility of dissent helping to pre-
vent carelessness on the part of judges when drafting majority
opinions; an appearance function, by helping to assure litigants
and the public alike that all sides of a case were duly considered by
all of the judges on a panel; and, lastly, an "ego" function, by pro-
viding a forum that allows an individual judge to distinguish him-
130 Id.
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self or herself from (and perhaps beyond) his or her peers.
The following discussion addresses the reasons why each of
several different types of dissent are issued. Proceeding under the
assumption that the functions listed above span the gamut of dis-
sent's possible functions, the following discussion also assumes that
from the text of a particular dissent may be gleaned the motives
for its issuance, which motives are assumed, for the most part, to
track dissent's various functions. While recognizing the reality of
multiple motivations, the following discussion declines to concede
that that reality prevents conclusions about motivation from being
properly drawn. Finally, the occurrence of dissent today being an
accepted and understood fact of life on every multi-judge appellate
court in the United States, the discussion below discounts as negli-
gible the prophylactic function's ability to provide particular in-
centive to dissent in any particular case.
Persuasion is the most important function of dissent, and the
legitimacy of any dissent that does not aim to persuade is doubt-
ful. Unfortunately, a minority of dissents-in the Second Circuit
and elsewhere-unquestionably are not calculated to persuade.
The object of measurement here is not the ultimate persuasiveness
of a subject dissent, but rather, the extent of the attempt at per-
suasiveness. An example may make clear the distinction sought to
be drawn.
The type of dissent that most clearly is not directed at persua-
sion is the dissent without opinion.137 Such a dissent registers disa-
greement, but that is both all, and nothing. The reaction of a panel
of judges to an advocate who, when called upon to argue his appel-
lant client's position, stated, "May it please the Court, I disagree
with the decision below," and then sat down, is not difficult to im-
agine: at a minimum, one can state with confidence, the Court
would not be pleased at all. A substantially similar reaction should
greet the dissent without opinion, the judicial equivalent of this
abandonment of reasoned discourse.
Such a dissent is deserving of opprobrium for two basic rea-
sons: (1) it does not do any good; and (2) it does do harm. The
potential for persuasion that traditionally provides the primary
justification for dissent is so obviously lacking that even the mere
M" The term, "dissent without opinion," as used herein, includes all dissents that state
nothing more substantive than "I dissent" or "I respectfully dissent," as well as all dissents
that literally are "without opinion."
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hope of persuasion cannot fairly be viewed as a consideration ani-
mating the dissent. Further, the dissent without opinion offers to
the public and to the present losing litigant at best insignificant
assurance that opposing arguments were carefully and fully consid-
ered. Thus, lacking any substantial relation to any of dissent's
other justifications, the dissent without opinion appears motivated
almost entirely by the purely personal, psychological benefit of dis-
association from a position that the dissenting judge, for whatever
reason, opposes. Such a benefit may inure always to a dis-
senter-and, as an incidental benefit, that may be well and
good-but much is left to be desired when the sole benefit and sole
motivator is psychological succor. This is because this personal
benefit is so easily outweighed by the systematic harms attributa-
ble to the dissent without opinion, which harms consist basically of
an intensified version of the same harms that are attributable to
dissents generally.
For example, the dissent without opinion harms the court as
an institution, to a greater extent than the reasoned dissent, since
it additionally and necessarily conveys at least one of the following
unflattering ideas: either the judge is dissenting without opinion
for no reason; or for a reason he or she is unwilling to articulate or
is uncapable of articulating; or because the judge believes that
both the judge's colleagues and superiors on the Bench are closed
to, or incapable of following, reasoned argument.13 The dissent
without opinion also is perhaps more injurious to collegiality than
is the reasoned dissent, the frustration of the majority author be-
ing more acute, with his or her opinion forever tarnished by an
unspecified charge of error to which he or she can never respond.13
Hardly more justifiable is the dissent that merely states, with-
out elaboration, a reason for disagreement with the majority's
view. Such a dissent is really no more viable as an instrument of
persuasion than is a dissent without opinion: "With all due re-
spect, the evidence is insufficient," is not the substance of an argu-
ment, but the summary of one. Standing alone, such a dissent
bears no more resemblance to an adequate legal argument than
" See Simpson, supra note 20, at 211; see generally B. WOLFMAN, J. SILVER & M.
SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FED-
ERAL TAX CASES passim (1975) (concluding that Justice Douglas's penchant for dissenting
without opinion in tax cases was damaging to respect for Court).
I See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 109 n.96; Simpson, supra note 20, at 210 n.21 (sug-
gesting "resentment" aggravated when judge concurs without opinion).
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Huck Finn's summary of Pilgrim's Progress ("a man ... left his
family, it didn't say why") 140 bears to sound literary criticism.
Dissents without elaboration often arise in highly fact-inten-
sive cases in which the court, "faced with indeterminate and inde-
terminable standards: reasonable notice, reasonable cause, gross
negligence, the requisite proof in fraud or in a criminal prosecu-
tion, 14 1 must decide whether the particular indeterminate and in-
determinable standard at issue has been met.142 Disagreement in
such cases is only natural-"he is a pedant who thinks other-
wise,"14 3 said Learned Hand-and it is tempting merely to note
without elaboration the disagreement and move on: tempting be-
cause, when the case involves the application of well-established,
though indeterminate and indeterminable standards, to a particu-
lar set of facts, judges are aware that a more developed opinion
often amounts to little more than the rationalization of an in-
formed gut reaction; tempting because the task of fully canvassing
all the evidence in such cases may demand an inordinate amount
of time and effort; and, finally, tempting because no matter how
much effort is expended, the fact-intensive nature of such cases
makes the expected yield in terms of recognition, prestige, or re-
versal unusually low.
The temptation should be avoided, however, basically for the
same reasons that a dissent without opinion should be avoided.
The dissent without elaboration may serve the appearance func-
tion slightly better than the dissent without opinion, but, as does
the dissent without opinion, it ill serves the persuasive function,
though not-also in common with the dissent without opin-
ion-the ego function, the fulfillment of which here again intrudes
too much on the decision to dissent.
Of course, there is no denying that both dissents without elab-
oration and dissents without opinion are less costly in terms of
time and effort than are full dissents; accordingly, one might con-
tend-and perhaps correctly-that a concern for efficiency also
motivates the issuance of these undeveloped dissents. But this
140 M. TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 104 (1885).
4' Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 332 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, C.J., concurring),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
142 See, e.g., Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1965) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (involving issue of whether "substantial evidence" supported findings of
NLRB).
143 Ford Motor Co., 182 F.2d at 332 (L. Hand, C.J., concurring).
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worthy motive does little to legitimize such dissents, for however
counterintuitive it may seem, ultimately such dissents poorly serve
the cause of efficiency.
To explain, it might be agreed that, under a particular set of
circumstances, a dissent without opinion or without elaboration
may be more appropriate than a full dissent. What might these
circumstances be? Circumstances in which a full dissent is nearly
certain to have no effect on the future development of the law;
circumstances in which a full dissent is nearly certain to have no
effect on the panel majority or judges of a higher or coordinate
court; and circumstances in which, because of the relative unim-
portance of the cause, the additional effort needed to write a full
dissent outweighs the slim chance that such a dissent might affect
the development of the law and/or the resolution of the case. But
these are precisely the circumstances under which a disagreeing
judge should forgo dissent entirely! The case for the undeveloped
dissent thus ultimately resolves itself into this: sometimes, it is not
the worst course of action. The problem, however, is that it is
never the best. When the cause is important, when persuasion is
possible, the undeveloped dissent is not enough; in other circum-
stances, as noted, it is too much.
Fortunately, dissents without opinion have never been com-
mon in the Second Circuit,14 4 and, probably due to the increased
availability of law clerks, dissents without elaboration have become
much less common in recent years. Indeed, for at least the last fifty
years, the vast majority of Second Circuit dissents have been (or at
least have aimed at being) fully developed, reasoned dissents. 45
1. It has been noted that in the early years of the Fifth Circuit, "often a judge dis-
sented without opinion." H. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981, at 31
(1984). The same cannot be said of the early years of the Second Circuit, but such dissents
were not entirely unknown. See, e.g., Maatschappij Tot Exploitatie Van Rademaker's Ko-
ninklijke Cacao & Chocoladefadrieken v. Kosloff, 45 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1930) (Chase, J.,
dissenting without opinion); Michel v. United States, 37 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1930) (Chase,
J., dissenting without opinion), rev'd, 282 U.S. 656 (1931). On the modern court, however,
dissents without opinion are virtually unknown, although, unfortunately, concurrences with-
out opinion are not. See, e.g., Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991) (Oakes,
C.J., concurring without opinion); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 578 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Cardamone, J., concurring without opinion); United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 923
(2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring without opinion).
14 In the first six months of 1991, for example, approximately 28 dissents were filed.
Quite typically, none of the dissents were without opinion, and only one can be considered
without elaboration. See United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403, 1420 (2d Cir. 1991) (Lum-
bard, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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Such dissents are obviously designed to persuade, and are obvi-
ously motivated by the desire to persuade. 14 6 Such dissents also
operate to satisfy the appearance function of dissent, whether or
not satisfaction of that function acts as a motivator. Does satisfac-
tion of the ego function act as a motivator? We can assume that it
does, but, in the context of a developed, reasoned dissent, it hardly
matters whether the answer is yes or no.
It is not unusual for a motivation deemed baneful in some cir-
cumstances to be viewed neutrally in others. Sex, for example, is
sanctioned by some religions for procreative purposes only, but, if
a particular procreative act also yields some slight modicum of per-
sonal pleasure-well, perhaps we sometimes do live in a Panglos-
sian world. In the same way, if a reasoned dissent fulfills its pri-
mary task of persuasion, it is of little negative consequence if, at
the same time, the ego is stroked and massaged as well (i.e., as long
as the loosing of the ego does not result in a dissent that is conde-
scendingly dismissive of the majority opinion, or that expressly
denigrates the majority author's character or ability, or that is oth-
erwise unduly damaging to collegiality). Indeed, given the futility
of eliminating as strong a motivating force as is the ego, one should
be thankful when that force finds its expression in the relatively
salutary form of the reasoned dissent. This is especially true since
the developed, reasoned dissent-in contrast to other types of dis-
sent-is subject to particularized criticism by the majority, which
fact tends to discourage those dissents most vulnerable to majority
criticism, and to encourage those least vulnerable. In other words,
to the extent ego concerns consciously or unconsciously may moti-
vate a dissent, those same concerns may also discourage a reasoned
dissent, as the issuance of such a dissent risks the engenderment of
a blow to the ego in the form of express and pointed majority con-
'41 The motive may reveal itself explicitly. See, e.g., Katharine Gibbs School, (Inc.) v.
FTC, 628 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial of petition for reh'g
in banc) (direct call for Supreme Court review); United States v. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d 136,
144 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (same), rev'd, 435 U.S. 268 (1978);
see also Audi Vision Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.,
concurring) (suggesting legislative action). However, recognition that not every case is ap-
propriate for Supreme Court review and fears of being labeled a judge who cries wolf have
tended to make direct invitations to higher authority no more than occasional. But the ab-
sence of such an invitation hardly means the absence of a motive to persuade. Whether the
dissenting judge simply contrasts the majority's opinion with Supreme Court (or circuit)
precedent and allows the higher authority to draw its own conclusions as to the necessity for
reversal, or utilizes a myriad of other persuasive tools, the same motive to persuade is at
least implicit in the making of every developed, reasoned dissent.
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tradiction. Thus, the ego motivation, in the context of a developed,
reasoned dissent, acts as a sort of quality control, sifting out those
dissents least likely to persuade, i.e., those dissents that can least
be justified.
The contrast with the dissent without opinion and the dissent
without elaboration is clear. These dissents permit no particular-
ized criticism, for they do not say anything to which such criticism
could attach. This absence of risk to the ego means the absence of
any ego-derived impetus for restraint. The result-an increased
frequency of undeveloped dissents on occasions in which no type of
dissent could be justified-is as harmful as it is obvious.
In sum, if it's worth disagreeing, it's worth saying why, even
when to say why requires a substantial investment in time and ef-
fort. A judge who concludes that saying why would take "too
much" time and "too much" effort, really has determined that the
subject case is not important enough even to try to effectively dis-
agree. That determination having been made, in light of the evi-
dent harms attributable to undeveloped dissents, the proper course
is not to dissent without opinion or without elaboration; rather, the
proper course is not to dissent at all. The ego function-the only
function well-served by such dissents - is simply not significant
enough to justify a different conclusion. Fortunately, as noted, on
today's Second Circuit, a different conclusion seldom is drawn.14
V. SOME LESSONS OF DISSENT
To this point, this Article has discussed individual judges al-
most exclusively in the context of its treatment of larger historical
patterns. The emphasis is different in this final section: here, the
primary focus will be upon the current judges of the Second Cir-
cuit as individuals, not as members of a collective embodying to a
greater or lesser degree a particular historical trend. The initial
aim is to discern individual patterns of dissent, for the ultimate
purpose of assisting practitioners in more effectively presenting
their arguments to the different judges of the Court.
First, however, a few words of explanation and limitation may
be in order. The explanation anticipates an objection to the con-
tention that a study of dissents may be helpful to practitioners,
namely, that a dissent, by definition, represents a losing argument,
and that an attorney who makes it a practice to rely on losing ar-
"4 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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guments mustn't much rely on his practice. It is true, of course,
that in the search for "good" authority, a plodding majority opin-
ion beats a sublime dissent nearly every time. But that is only to
say that one should not mistake a dissent for the opinion of the
court. My point is that circuit court dissents contain lessons of
their own beyond an articulation of the law of a particular circuit.
The most important of these lessons illuminate an overall ap-
proach to judging that transcends the relatively narrow confines of
a particular body of substantive law. While these lessons are un-
likely to be of determinative assistance when the law of the circuit
is clearly contrary to one's position, there are many cases in which
the law is not so well-defined. Experience is likely to teach attor-
neys who heed dissents' lessons to view these latter cases as fertile
fields of opportunity.
Those who ignore dissents' lessons, on the other hand, are
likely to find the same fields considerably more barren, yet not
(these are the words of limitation) as barren as they might be in
the absence of a Second Circuit practice adopted in response to the
Judge Manton bribery scandal. Judge Manton-until he resigned
in 1939, the Second Circuit's senior, i.e., chief judge14 5s-was con-
victed that same year of obstruction of justice and intent to de-
fraud the United States. His curious sense of judicial ethics was
captured in a nutshell in his petition to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, in which he argued that "it serves no public pol-
icy for a high judicial officer to be convicted of a judicial crime, for
[it] tends to destroy the confidence of the people in the court." 4"
Judge Manton's remaining legacy is the Second Circuit's practice
of not publicly revealing the composition of a panel until noon of
the Thursday of the week prior to argument.1 50 The laudable in-
tent of the practice obviously is to reduce the risk of improper con-
tacts between judges and advocates, but an incidental effect (at
least on a large court that sits in panels of three) is that it effec-
tively eliminates the opportunity to tailor one's brief to a specific
148 While the term "chief judge" was not adopted until 1948, see Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 45(a), 62 Stat. 869, 871, the "senior circuit judge" in the years prior to 1948 is
generally recognized as having served in a comparable position. Readers who wish to quibble
over this point are directed to the lobby outside the Second Circuit's Foley Square court-
room, where, speaking louder than a thousand words, one can find Judge Manton's picture
in a photographic display of all Second Circuit "chief judges."
14. J.P. MAcKENztE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 227 (1974). Understandably unmoved
by this appeal, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
"'o M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 88.
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judicial audience, since (except in in banc cases) the composition
of one's panel is not known at the time briefs must be filed. Such
tailoring is limited to the oral argument stage of an appeal. To be
sure, this reduces the advocate's opportunity to engage in judge-
specific argument but just as surely it does not eliminate it com-
pletely. It is entirely legitimate to emphasize different matters in
one's oral and written presentations, and, under the right circum-
stances, also entirely prudent and wise: consistency's loss could
well be one's client's gain.251
What points might one emphasize (or minimize, as the case
may be) before particular judges? The question is addressed in the
paragraphs that follow. In the main, the raw materials from which
this Part's conclusions are drawn are each judge's dissents. Dis-
sents do reveal a judge's particular interests; indeed, as Ninth Cir-
cuit Judge Alex Kozinski recently has suggested, they do so more
effectively than a judge's majority opinions." 2 In a majority opin-
ion, as another federal appellate judge has noted, "there is compro-
mising in order to reach consensus. A judge often conforms his lan-
guage in order to avoid antagonisms. ' 153 Because of this, one can
"' See Bright, Getting There, 77 A.B.A. J. 68, 71 (March 1991). In his A.B.A. Journal
article, Eighth Circuit Judge Myron H. Bright concluded tailoring can be effective, id., and
that oral argument "can play a significant role in many cases," id. at 72; see also F. WEINER,
EFFE CTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 11-12 (1950) (contending "cases frequently are won and lost
on oral argument"); Feinberg, supra note 119, at 306 (noting importance of oral argument).
52 Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1711 (1991). Although
there are dangers in assuming too direct a connection between the dissents and interests of
a judge on an intermediate appellate court, by and large a substantial correlation can be
discerned. Second Circuit Judge Thurgood Marshall's dissents, for example, quite accurately
portended the ultimate expression of his judicial philosophy as a Supreme Court Justice.
For example, a majority of Judge Marshall's dissents evidenced a greater solicitude than the
majority to the rights of criminal defendants and habeas petitioners, see United States v.
Aviles, 337 F.2d 552, 560 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965); United States v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1964) (in banc) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), aff'd, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); United States v. Fay, 350 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1965) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1019 (1966), civil rights demonstrators, see Peo-
ple v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 275 (2d Cir.) (Marshall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 977 (1965), employees, see Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir.
1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and victims of racially-motivated discrimination, see
Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 341 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Goldman, supra note 118, at 479 (quoting unidentified circuit judge). The extent to
which a judge may conform his or her language is indicated by Chief Justice Hughes's re-
ported comment that "he tried to write his opinions clearly and logically, but if he needed
the fifth vote of a colleague who insisted on putting in a paragraph that did not belong, in it
went, and let the law reviews figure out what it meant." W. REHNQUIST, supra note 29, at
302; see also B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE 33-36 (1931) (con-
trasting writing of majority and minority opinions).
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rarely be certain at which point the majority author has ended and
the compromising has begun.
No such uncertainty is presented by a dissent. Thus, when a
judge expresses in dissent a particular type of concern in a particu-
lar manner time and time again, the conclusion is inescapable that
the judge's pattern of dissent is reflective of a heightened interest
in the matters consistently raised in dissent. Whether, in dissent-
ing, the judge is right or wrong is not, for our purposes, of much
importance; what is important is the insight provided by such dis-
sents into the judge's overall approach to the art of judging. Dis-
sents may also yield insights of a more particularized sort, e.g., the
dissenting judge's view of the extent of the rights accorded to indi-
viduals under the fourth amendment, and these insights may in
some instances be of great assistance to the advocate. However,
useful though the narrower inquiry can be, such is not the focus
here. Instead, the focus will be upon patterns of dissent which may
suggest increased receptivity not so much to a particular substan-
tive argument as to a particular type of argument.
A. Just the Facts
The job of a federal appellate judge is to establish and clarify
the law, not to make factual findings. Yet, appellate assessment of
the facts is at the heart of many appeals, either directly (whether
the factual findings of the district judge are "clearly erroneous"),
or indirectly (quasi-factual determinations such as the sufficiency
of the evidence or the existence of a genuine issue of material fact).
It is apparent from a review of their dissents that judges' interest
in such questions differs remarkably. 54
15 A judge's interest in factual matters is measured herein primarily by the frequency
with which he or she has dissented on such matters. To some extent, the accuracy of the
measure is subject to dispute; such frequent dissent may merely signify a generally idiosyn-
cratic view. But the nature of fact-focused dissents, combined with consideration of the
factors that influence the decision to dissent, militate against this conclusion. A decision
that turns on the appropriateness of a factual assessment is unlikely to attract the attention
of either the in banc circuit court or the Supreme Court. This is because few such decisions
have any but the most limited precedential significance; most cases of this sort involve a sui
generis inquiry based upon well-established legal standards. It is thus generally easier to
acquiesce in a decision one disagrees with when one's disagreement is rooted in a differing
factual assessment, since it is easier to conclude one's dissent will affect neither the ultimate
resolution of the case nor the future course of the law. Therefore, regardless of whether their
conclusions are right or wrong, those judges who frequently decline to take the easier route
of acquiescence, by their actions, can properly be considered as having demonstrated a
heightened interest in fact-related issues.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The record of Judge Amalya L. Kearse, for example, indicates
great sensitivity to fact-related issues. Since her appointment to
the Second Circuit in 1979, Judge Kearse has averaged about three
dissents per year, approximately half of which were fact-based.
While Judge Kearse's overall rate of dissent places her squarely in
the middle of the court, no Second Circuit judge dissents more
often over fact-based issues.
One inclination of Judge Kearse is particularly apparent from
a reading of her dissents: a relatively pronounced reluctance to de-
cide disputes by summary judgment. Six times Judge Kearse has
dissented from her colleagues' affirmance, or remand for entry, of a
summary judgment;' 5 never has she dissented from a reversal of
the same. Because the first rule of oral advocacy is to address mat-
ters the judges are interested in,156 and because Judge Kearse has
indicated through her dissents an interest in the operation of the
summary judgment rule, appellants would be well-advised to press
any legitimate issues of summary judgment before a panel on
which Judge Kearse is sitting. This is true even if they otherwise
might be inclined to emphasize something different, e.g., a jurisdic-
tional issue. It is also true even if one is convinced by Judge
Kearse's prior opinions that one's written brief is sufficient to win
her vote; after all, the reason Judge Kearse's presence makes pur-
suit of a summary judgment issue more appealing is not that she
controls all the votes necessary to issue a persuasive dissent, but
rather, that she controls half the votes necessary to the issuance of
a favorable binding order. While an advocate could scarcely hope
for a more capable ally than Judge Kearse, it is an elementary rule
of appellate advocacy that one ally, no matter how capable, is sim-
ply not enough.
Judge Kearse's dissents also evidence, to a greater degree than
the dissents of most of her colleagues, a tendency to defer on fac-
tual matters to the finder of fact, whether that fact-finder is a dis-
trict judge,15  a jury,158 or an administrative agency. 59  The
"I United States Fire Ins. Co. v. PKFinans Int'l Corp., 904 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1990)
(Kearse, J., dissenting); Jamie Sec. Co. v. The Limited, Inc., 880 F.2d 1572, 1578 (2d Cir.
1989) (Kearse, J., dissenting); American Home Assurance Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
845 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1988) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Shockley v. Vermont State Colleges,
793 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1986) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37,
46 (2d Cir. 1982) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Keeler v. Joy, 641 F.2d 1044, 1055 (2d Cir.)
(Kearse, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
1 See Davis, The Argument of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896 (1940).
,5 See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 285 (2d Cir.
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strength of this conclusion is diluted somewhat by the fact that
Judge Kearse has on at least two occasions dissented from her col-
leagues' acceptance of the fact-finders' determinations;160 perhaps
it would be more indisputably accurate to state that Judge Kearse
has devoted an uncommon amount of energy toward ensuring the
(in her view) proper application of appellate standards of review of
factual findings. In that case, the most indisputably prudent advice
one might give to an appellant or appellee scheduled to argue
before Judge Kearse is not to concentrate on the "legal" issues of
one's case to the exclusion of the "factual" issues, because if the
latter issues may be determinative, determinative they may well
be.
After Judge Kearse, Judge Ellsworth Van Graafeiland is the
most fact-sensitive member of the Second Circuit. But differences
between the two judges exist beyond the relative frequency with
which they evidence such sensitivity through dissent. Judge Van
Graafeiland, for example, does not seem to share Judge Kearse's
aversion to summary judgments. What Judge Van Graafeiland
does do, however, more so than any other judge on the court, is to
give effect to what might be called the "let's have a little common
sense" rule of judging, which rule is based on the premise that
"[jiudges are not 'forbidden to know as judges what [they] see as
[women and] men."' 161 Thus, Judge Van Graafeiland has dis-
sented to a reversal of a grant of judgment n.o.v. against an em-
ployee who secretly had recorded conversations with his employer
because "I would not have [such a person] working for me," and "I
am satisfied that [neither would my colleagues]";"62 has dissented
1986) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Olivieri v. Ward, 766 F.2d 690, 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Kearse, J., dissenting).
1"8 See United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 955 (2d Cir. 1987) (in banc) (Kearse, J.,
dissenting); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Kearse, J., dissenting).
"I See Barone v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1989) (Kearse, J., dissenting); Fel-
shina v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1983) (Kearse, J., dissenting).
"0 See Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir.) (Kearse, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Kearse, J., dissenting), cert. denied. 474 U.S. 981 (1985).
16 People v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.) (Kaufman, J., concurring) (quoting
Ho Al Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552, 560, (1879) (No. 6,546)), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977
(1965).
"I Heller v. Champion Int'l Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1989) (Van Graafeiland,
J., dissenting). Judge Van Graafeiland concluded his opinion in Heller by noting his "regret
... that, as a result of our ruling in this case, every disgruntled employee in the Second
Circuit henceforth will feel free to report to work with a tape recorder hidden on his per-
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to an affirmation of a judgment against a manufacturer in a prod-
ucts liability case because the product was labeled "caustic" and
"[ijf there was ever an English word whose meaning is crystal
clear, that word is 'caustic' ,,;163 and has dissented to an affirmation
of a judgment that found police officers and their employer, the
County of Suffolk, liable for malicious prosecution because "the
jury's verdict.., that no damages were caused by the individual
defendants but that $300,000 in damages were caused by the
County [is, at] the least, . . . bizarre. ' 16 4 The lesson to advocates
appearing before Judge Van Graafeiland is to be especially alert to
the presence of, and be prepared to highlight or discount, similar
"dispositive" facts, which have their root in the judge's perception
of "common sense," especially when the consequence of the court's
failing to accept such facts may be to cast unjust aspersions on the
innocent, or to reward the unsavory and disreputable.1 65
That such an approach may be productive is reinforced by a
second tendency of Judge Van Graafeiland, which is to use to an
uncommon degree dictionary definitions for support.16 6 This ten-
dency is related to the first in that a dictionary constitutes a codifi-
cation of the "common sense" of words. The technique possesses a
veneer of neutrality that may not always be justified: for example,
a law school professor of mine, who clerked on the New York
Court of Appeals in the late 1950's, has related that when he was
clerking he once searched for two weeks, through a score of dic-
tionaries, to find the decidedly uncommon definition of "solicita-
tion" needed to resolve a case in accordance with his judge's predi-
lection. 167 To his credit, Judge Van Graafeiland appears never to
son." Id. at 439.
"' Billiar v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 248 (2d Cir. 1980) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
' Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 155 (2d Cir. 1991) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting).
1" See, e.g., Heller, 891 F.2d at 438-39 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (expressing
regrets that majority "pat Heller on the back for his contemptible conduct while they casti-
gate Mark Davenport for doing what his conscience and his advisers told him was the
proper thing to do").
160 See, e.g., Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir.
1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (definition of "the")); Billiar, 623 F.2d at 248 (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (definition of "caustic"); United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d
510, 521 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (definition of "predisposition");
Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 950-51 (2d Cir. 1975) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting) (definition of "posthumous").
1"I The perfunctory memorandum opinion that followed affirmed without comment the
opinion of the intermediate appellate court. The only allusion to the definitional search is
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have used a dictionary definition to bolster an uncommon usage;
having on many occasions witnessed the judge's piranha-like ap-
proach to oral argument, it is suggested that the advocate who
takes a different approach does so at his or her peril. But when the
common definition may be helpful, the advocate, more so with
Judge Van Graafeiland than with any other judge, should not hesi-
tate to review and possibly refer to it, and perhaps even make it a
focus of his or her presentation.
Except for Chief Judge Oakes, none of the other judges on the
Second Circuit are as distinctly interested in factual matters as are
Judges Van Graafeiland and Kearse. Judges Newman, Richard J.
Cardamone, Lawrence W. Pierce, Ralph K. Winter, and George C.
Pratt are particularly disinclined to dissent on such a basis. Judges
Feinberg and William H. Timbers appear interested primarily in
discouraging what they regard as instances of appellate fact-find-
ing. Judges Roger J. Miner and Francis X. Altimari have demon-
strated greater receptivity to fact-based arguments than the least
inclined of their colleagues, but it is still too early in their Second
Circuit careers to make an assessment beyond this. None of the
judges on the court, of course, are entirely closed to the type of
arguments discussed above in this Part; a good fact-based argu-
ment is thus worth making no matter what the composition of
one's panel.168 Some judges are more receptive than others, how-
ever; when an advocate possesses the luxury of multiple argu-
ments, the panel's composition should be one factor in determining
which of such arguments to emphasize.
B. The Principle of the Thing
All appellate judges articulate principles of law and apply
those principles to the facts before them. All appellate judges also
an indirect reference, by the reporter, noting that two judges dissented "upon the ground
that there was no evidence to establish solicitation ..... See People v. Liebenthal, 5 N.Y.2d
876, 876, 155 N.E.2d 871, 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d 26, 26 (1959); compare Pittson Coal Group v.
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (majority opinion by Justice Scalia utilizing Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary) with id. at 134 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (utilizing for
same word Webster's Third New International Dictionary).
I"3 During the 1989-90 Term, for example, Judge Pierce, perhaps the Second Circuit
judge least inclined to dissent on the basis of a differing factual assessment, wrote two major
opinions that turned, at least in part, on appellate rejection of the fact-finders' determina-
tions. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311-20 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1161-62, 1167 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990).
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from time to time disagree with their colleagues' articulation or ap-
plication, and record such disagreements in formal dissents. This
section is not concerned with identification of particular principles
that may with greater or lesser regularity provide the forum for
particular judges' disputes. Instead, it will identify different broad
approaches typically taken by judges in the course of articulating
their reasons for dissenting on matters involving legal principles.
The practical utility of this section concededly depends upon
whether the type of argument typically advanced by a judge in dis-
sent corresponds to the type of argument a judge is most receptive
to hearing from an advocate. In the opinion of the author, a close
correspondence does exist. The purpose of most dissents, after all,
is to persuade, and, in attempting to persuade, judges will tend to
use the mode of argument they themselves find most persuasive.
The biggest difference in styles of argument between judges is
in the extent to which reasoning explicitly derived from broad
principles is favored and the ease with which broad conclusions are
drawn. Some judges often argue from such principles and often
draw such conclusions; others, preferring more narrowly based ar-
guments, hardly ever do so. Chief Judge Oakes is probably the Sec-
ond Circuit's foremost exponent of the former approach. The con-
cluding paragraph of his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Cattouse'6 9 is a paradigmatic example of it:
I could prolong this dissent. I end it with a sense of futility.
To my mind the majority's willingness to expand the exigent cir-
cumstances exception is but another sad paragraph in a book that
could be entitled The Erosion of the Fourth Amendment. And I
fear the chapters that have yet to be written.17 0
One might compare this to Judge Pierce's narrowly tailored
conclusion in United States v. Moreno'7' that the majority had
gone too far in extending the plain view exception to the fourth
amendment's prohibition against warrantless seizures:
In sum, this case brings us uncomfortably close to holding
that the mere viewing of a package of the type present here, by
itself, constitutes probable cause. See [United States v. Barrios-
Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1989)] (rejecting suggestion that
"the mere viewing and evaluation of the package alone consti-
9 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 929 (1988).
170 Id. at 150 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
171 897 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3250 (1990).
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tuted probable cause."). I feel constrained to reverse .... 172
Initially, it should be noted that the case cited by Judge
Pierce, Barrios-Moriera, was also a case involving the plain view
exception from which Judge Pierce dissented. Judge Pierce might
then have concluded that Moreno was another paragraph in, if not
a book that could be entitled The Erosion of the Fourth Amend-
ment, then at least an essay. But, despite the similarities in subject
matter and in viewpoint as to the direction of the law, Judge
Pierce took an entirely different tack in summarizing his position.
First, Judge Pierce confined himself narrowly to the issue
before him. In contrast to Chief Judge Oakes, who more or less
suggested in his concluding paragraph that the current state of
fourth amendment jurisprudence resembled "so much codswal-
lop," 173 Judge Pierce accepted the current law without critical
comment. The citation to Barrios-Moriera is not, after all, to his
own dissent in that case, but to the majority opinion from which
he dissented.
Another difference is in the two judges' descriptions of future
consequences. Characteristically, Chief Judge Oakes took a broad
position, saying he "fear[ed] the chapters that have yet to be writ-
ten," but declining to state with any particularity exactly what he
feared those chapters would entail. Also characteristically, Chief
Judge Oakes suggested it was not merely any particular case prece-
dents that were in danger, but the fourth amendment itself.
Judge Pierce, on the other hand, stated with exactitude the
future consequence he feared, and rather than overtly rooting the
fear in fourth amendment concerns, more narrowly rooted it in
concern for the viability of circuit precedent.
Each of these approaches has its respective strengths and
weaknesses, in majority as well as in separate opinion-writing.
Quotability, not at all a matter of insignificance in the appellate
judging business, is the most obvious strength of the broader ap-
proach. It allows a judge's words to have impact on matters beyond
the particulars of the case for which the words were written. The
strength of the narrower approach is that, like a tool designed to
perform one task and one task only, it is more likely to help ac-
complish that task than a tool of more general application. A ma-
jority opinion written by a judge writing in the narrower style, for
"' Id. at 34 (Pierce, J., dissenting).
173 United States v. Valencia, 677 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1982) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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example, is more likely to become, and stay, a viable precedent. At
the same time, however,' it is less likely to be of assistance when
another task needs doing, i.e., when one is looking to stretch a pre-
cedent, or apply one in an analogous situation. This is the major
weakness of the narrow approach, a weakness the broader ap-
proach does not share.
The major weakness of the broader approach is that on some
occasions, being more provocative of dissent, it may draw a dissent
when a more narrowly drawn opinion would not, and thus may de-
prive "the bar [of] the [superior] guidance of a unanimous opin-
ion.' 1 7 4 It can hardly be considered coincidental that the two
judges on the current court most committed to the broad ap-
proach-Chief Judge Oakes and Judge Cardamone-are also the
judges whose majority opinions most often find other judges writ-
ing separately in dissent or concurrence. Conversely, Judges Fein-
berg, Kearse, and Pierce, all of whom write in the narrower style,
are least likely to find other members of a panel dissenting from or
separately concurring with their majority opinions.175
Neither the broad nor narrow approach is necessarily better
than the other; each is in its own right legitimate. When Judges
Learned and Augustus Hand were on the Second Circuit, practi-
tioners who advised, "Quote Learned, but follow Gus," were not
slighting either, but merely recognizing the most obvious attributes
of each approach. 76 Augustus Hand, more so than his cousin, held
the center of the court, in large part due to his understated, nar-
row, one-case-at-a-time approach. In that position, he wielded tre-
mendous influence. 7 7 But there is also no doubt that outside the
circuit, in other courts and in academia, Learned Hand was more
influential, as was his colleague Judge Frank, perhaps as adept at
the broad approach as any judge in history.
174 See Feinberg, supra note 119, at 301.
175 Judge Cardamone is the judge least likely, by far, to obtain unanimous support.
Chief Judge Oakes is next, followed, in order, by Judges Winter, Meskill, Pratt, Newman,
Kearse, Pierce, and Feinberg. Obviously, not all judges of the Second Circuit are included in
this listing. The list does include, however, all judges who were on active status in 1982 and
who maintained active status at least until 1990. In the interests of accuracy, other judges
were excluded so as to ensure that conclusions were derived from a large sample of cases,
and not distorted by inequalities in caseloads.
176 Actually, part of Learned Hand's genius as a judge was that to a large extent he
embodied the best of two worlds; although he generally took a narrow approach to opinion-
writing (though not as narrow as Augustus Hand), he nonetheless remained among the most
quotable of judges.
177 See M. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 321; Wyzanski, supra note 109, at 583.
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The upshot of all this for the practitioner is that, in readying
one's argument, one should prepare to address the particular con-
cerns that the judge's general approach indicates he or she is prob-
ably most interested in. It is foolish to assume too great a differ-
ence between the two approaches; the exigencies of legal argument
usually do keep the expressed range of views within a relatively
circumscribed area. But it is equally foolish to assume no differ-
ence exists. Thus, before Judges Feinberg, Kearse, and Pierce, it is
best to argue narrowly; before Chief Judge Oakes and Judge
Cardamone, a broader approach may be more productive. Often,
there is more than one way to win a case; an advocate who insists
upon arguing a case in the manner he or she feels most comforta-
ble with, in disregard of the approach most likely to appeal to the
advocate's judges, disserves his or her client.17 8
Before leaving this section, one more matter might be noted,
related to the discussion above, having to do with Judge Newman.
More often than any other judge on the court, usually in concur-
rence but sometimes in dissent, Judge Newman writes separately
to express his views on the future implications and the limits of
the legal principles articulated by the court in its decisions.17 9 Nor-
178 D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald has stated that "a judge sometimes decides
whether to file a... dissent... based... upon the support she can anticipate from her
clerks." Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REv. 152, 153 (1990). In the same way, a
judge may decide whether to press an issue with his or her colleagues based upon the sup-
port he or she has received from an advocate.
179 See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for reh'g in banc) (writing "to allay...
misunderstanding"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990); United States v. Coonan, No. 90-
1223, slip op. at 6384 (2d Cir. July 16, 1991) (Newman, J., concurring) ("writ[ing] separately
to illuminate [a] perplexing issue"); United States v. Salerno, 829 F.2d 345, 346 (2d Cir.
1987) (Newman, J., concurring) (noting constitutionality of statute still an open question);
Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Newman, J., concurring) (writing "to identify a difficulty"); Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d
893, 906 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring) (writing to "express a caution"), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 765 (2d Cir. 1984) (New-
man, J., concurring) (writing "separately to express a caution"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985); United States v. Hannon, 728 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concur-
ring) (noting "matter less clear than the majority opinion suggests" and identifying issue
that "remains to be determined"); Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (New-
man, J., concurring) ("identifying... risk now [to] serve as a caution to... future panel");
United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., concurring) (writing separately
in "hope that [majority] dictum will not in future cases ripen into a holding"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 854 (1982); Calavo Growers v. Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman,
J., concurring) ("add[ing] a word of caution to emphasize the [applicable] controlling princi-
ples"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 958 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Newman, J., concurring) (writing to emphasize "limiting principle for [court's] decision"),
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
mally, Judge Newman writes to narrow the reach of the majority
decision. At least for lawyers who can predict with relative cer-
tainty where the future interests of their clientele will lie, the les-
son is plain. When before Judge Newman, more so than when
before other members of the court, if advantageous to one's posi-
tion, one should discuss possible future undesirable consequences
of a broadly-worded adverse decision, as well as ways to limit such
consequences. The result may not turn defeat into vic-
tory-indeed, such discussion may require arguendo assumption of
some type of adverse decision-but it might limit the extent of
one's defeat: "he who in argument just a little budges, may live to
argue before other judges."
C. The Respectful Dissent
The great majority of dissents on the Second Circuit are to-
day-and have always been-cast in the most respectful of terms.
Sturm und Drang there may be at the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit,180 and at the Supreme Court too' 81-and this may be reflected
in the opinions of these courts-but at the Second Circuit, the
opinions reflect, if not always sunny skies and carefree times, at
least a more temperate climate relatively free from the stresses of
personally directed invective.
The first lesson that may be drawn from this fact-that the
advocate should take particular care to address the appellate court
in similarly civil and respectful terms-is rather obvious and easy
to apply, and, in fact, commonly is applied. The only additional
point that might be noted is that the veneer of respectfulness the
advocate extends to the appellate judges ought to be extended as
well to the district judge whose judgment is being questioned upon
appeal. A majority of the members of the Second Circuit were at
one time district judges, and such judges tend to remain sensitive
to real or perceived slightings of their former colleagues on the
rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
" See Mikva, Sturm und Drang at the D.C. Circuit, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1064
(1989) (current D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva characterizes some dissents as
"turgid" with "ad hominem-ad feminem overtones"); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.
Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 913-32 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denial of suggestion for rehearing
in banc).
181 Quick, Whatever Happened to Respectful Dissent?, 77 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (June 1991)
(criticizing trend on Supreme Court toward "opinion-writing that reeks of condescension").
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trial bench.182
Judge Carroll C. Hincks, for example, who served as Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut before his appointment to the Second Circuit in 1953, was
said by his Second Circuit colleague, Judge Harold R. Medina, to
be so solicitous of the feelings of district judges that, when revers-
ing the judgment below, he would not even use the word "re-
versed" unless he was "outraged.' 1 83 Similarly, Judge Timbers,
who followed in Judge Hincks's footsteps in serving as Chief Judge
of the District of Connecticut before being appointed to the Sec-
ond Circuit, often has demonstrated his own determination to en-
sure that district judges are accorded the esteem and respect that
is properly due them. Judge Timbers has, for instance, taken care
to excise from the well-established "abuse of discretion" standard
of review any intimations of judicial misconduct:
As must be obvious to all, references in this opinion to abuse
of discretion ... on the part of the district judge are not to be
taken as any reflection by the author of this opinion upon the
district judge personally. Such [a] term[] simply express[es] the
judicial standard[] to be invoked .... My colleagues and I hold
Judge Stewart in the highest esteem. The benchmark of a truly
competent district judge-as with Judge Stewart in the instant
case-is his capacity to insure that the record demonstrates with
crystal clarity the basis of his exercise of discretion... so that a
reviewing court can determine abuse of discretion.., or the ab-
sence thereof."8'
Judge Timbers has expressed similarly protective sentiments on a
number of other occasions.185 On account of this protective atti-
,82 This is not to say that the circuit judges without district court experience are insen-
sitive, but, unable as they are to muster up personal memories of a wrongheaded appellate
reversal, they do tend to be a bit less passionate in rebutting perceived unwarranted
criticisms.
183 Proceedings from the Joint Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in
Memory of Honorable Carroll C. Hincks 26 (December 21, 1964), in 342 F.2d (comments of
Judge Medina).
18, SEC v. Stewart, 476 F.2d 755, 759 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Griesa, 481 F.2d 276, 281 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., dissenting)
("[a]s we repeatedly have stated, the reference to 'abuse of discretion' on the part of the
district judge is not to be taken as any reflection upon the district judge personally").
18 See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1978) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting from denial of motion for reh'g in banc) (court's decision "demeaning to the trial
judge"); United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1976) (Timbers, J., dissenting)
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tude-which permeates the court 186-it is suggested that counsel
for the appellant, in detailing the magnitude of the district judge's
errors, avoid cavalier dismissal of the district court's opinion (espe-
cially when before Judge Timbers, who does seem the Second Cir-
cuit member most sensitive to "attacks" upon the honor of the dis-
trict court). The district judges are viewed as partners in the
administration of justice, not as inferiors, and the advocate who
adopts a tone of superiority to the district judge should recognize
that by doing so he or she thereby implicitly adopts a tone of supe-
riority to the appellate judges, whose favor is ultimately necessary
to the advocate's success.
A substantially more subtle and substantially more conjectural
lesson that may be drawn from the language of dissent derives
from the employment by some judges of standardized language to
indicate the depth of the judge's disagreement with the majority.
Judge Timbers, for example, typically either "respectfully dis-
sents, 18 7 or "respectfully but emphatically (or most emphatically)
dissents."' 8 The inclusion of the word "emphatically" in some but
("majority decision is the most unwarranted interference with a conscientious district
judge[] ... that I have seen in more than sixteen years on the federal bench"); Redington v.
Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 1978) (Timbers, J., concurring) (noting dis-
trict judge did not have benefit of SEC amicus brief), rev'd, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); cf. United
States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1990) (Timbers, J., dissenting) (quoting his own
concurring opinion in United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 38 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), Judge Tim-
bers describes District Judge Bartels (the trial judge in both Busic and Purnett) as "one of
the most conscientious and experienced federals trial judges in the United States," and
states that majority's refusal to affirm Judge Bartel's decision "will force district judges in
our Circuit to be baffled").
'"8 The generally protective attitude extends beyond sensitivity to criticism, to sensitiv-
ity to other, probably more onerous burdens, such as workload. See, e.g., Nance v. Kelly, 912
F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1990) (Pratt, J., dissenting) ("[r]eversal adds extra, useless burdens to
the work of the district court"); Karl v. Board of Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Pratt, J., dissenting) (congressional act "created a potential for thrusting many additional
difficult cases on already overworked district judges"); hear, e.g., oral argument, United
States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.) (recorded November 3, 1989) (cassette recording on
file with Second Circuit Court Clerk), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 433 (1990). The Supreme
Court is similarly protective of the courts of appeals; for example, it "once informally re-
buked the Solicitor General's Office for stating accurately.., in a petition for certiorari that
only in the named court of appeals were NLRB decisions almost always overturned, thereby
impugning anti-Labor bias to the judges." R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 315 n.6 (2d ed. 1989).
187 See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886, 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1982) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1982) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting); Durham Indus., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 673 F.2d 37, 41, 43 (2d Cir.) (Tim-
bers, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
188 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1988) (Timbers,
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not all dissents appears anything but random; even a cursory re-
view will reveal that, without exception, Judge Timbers' "em-
phatic" dissents possess a harshness of rhetoric alien to his other,
"non-emphatic," dissents. Similarly, Judge Feinberg's "emphatic"
dissents are considerably sharper than the dissents in which he
simply "respectfully dissents." 189
Is this to say anything more than Judges Feinberg and Tim-
bers mean what they say when they say "emphatically"? Perhaps
not, but information of this sort indeed may be highly useful, as
anyone who's ever played poker or heard words of love surely must
concede. It connotes nothing sinister, suggests nothing of the bluff
or the lie, to imply judges do not always say exactly what they
mean. Especially when discussing a matter of no conceivable prece-
dential import, such as the characterization of one's own dissent, a
judge could easily employ reflexively a preferred phrase, with no
more meaning intended than a Senator from California might at-
tribute to his Senate floor reference to "the gentleman from North
Carolina." Understanding this, unless they have read carefully a
sufficient number of a judge's dissents to see a pattern emerge,
practitioners reasonably might be inclined to view the characteriz-
ing words as so much boilerplate. But, at least in the cases of
Judges Feinberg and Timbers, that would be a mistake.
In what manner might an advocate utilize knowledge of a par-
ticular pattern? Such knowledge could influence the advocate's as-
sessment of circuit precedent. Precedents are like rubberbands;
how much ground they cover at any particular moment depends
largely on whether they are then being pulled and stretched, or
rolled up and pocketed. A judge who has dissented emphatically
regarding a particular issue may be more inclined than other
J., dissenting), vacated sub noma. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872
F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1010, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Timbers, J., dissenting); Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274,*293, 297 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Timbers, J., dissenting); Davis v. Smith, 607 F.2d 535, 543 (2d Cir. 1979) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting from grant of petition for reh'g).
1M9 Compare, e.g., Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206, 216 (2d
Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908 (1987); Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971)
and United States v. Follette, 379 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1967) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)
with O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1091 (2d Cir. 1978) (Feinberg, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); United States v. Carpenter, 457 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Feinberg, J., dissenting) and Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 182 (2d
Cir. 1971) (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
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judges to view favorably attempts to reduce the scope of the disfa-
vored precedent, or to stretch the reach of possibly countervailing
decisions. With such a judge on one's panel, one may, with greater
hope for success, and lesser concern for loss of credibility, press an
issue that otherwise might be considered a lost, almost certainly
lost, or even damaging, cause. If the panel is not identical, and the
two cases not beyond the highly developed and often highly crea-
tive powers of distinguishment typically possessed by federal
judges, one could pick up a second vote.
One might also use the presence or absence of certain key
words to gauge the probable utility of suggesting rehearing in banc.
"Usually, full-court review depends on a dissenter who can line up
allies":190 it is usually further dependent upon whether the dis-
senter even tries to line up allies-often, dissenting judges do not
request a poll of the full court. The less the dissenter's discontent,
the more likely it is that no poll will be requested. Thus, an under-
standing of the words the dissenter uses to express relative degrees
of discontent provides a shorthand approach to accurately assess-
ing the probable value of suggesting in banc review.
D. Chief Judge Oakes and the Lessons of the Chief Judgeship
Since his elevation to the Second Circuit from the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont, Chief Judge
Oakes has been by far the court's most frequent dissenter. Over
the course of two decades on the appellate bench, he has averaged
more than seven dissents per year. Except for Judges J. Edward
Lumbard, Jr. and Van Graafeiland, no other current Second Cir-
cuit judge has written separately at even half the rate of the cur-
rent Chief Judge.
Why so many dissents? Perhaps it is the mark of a vastly su-
perior mind; perhaps the mark of a mind exceptionally contrary in
instinct; perhaps it evidences a desperate attempt to force interac-
tion with his colleagues and thus overcome the terrible loneliness
and isolation of life in Brattleboro, Vermont.19' Perhaps, but prob-
190 Sturgess, supra note 35, at 7.
FED. R. EvD. 201. Modern-day Ethan Allens and other sensitive Vermont natives
are additionally directed to Chief Judge Oakes' recognition of Vermont's distinctive influ-
ence upon him, see United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 175 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for reh'g in banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980), to be
considered in conjunction with his confession to occasional feelings of aloneness, see Oakes,
supra note 27, at 714.
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ably not, unless the presence of any of these possible causes has
greatly lessened since 1989, the year in which Chief Judge Oakes's
yearly rate of dissent first began an appreciable decline to its cur-
rent level, which is one that is average for the court. Assuming, for
the moment, since it seems an accurate assumption, that the Chief
Judge is now just as intelligent, just as contrary in instinct, and
just as lonely as he was in 1988, we should initially look for other
reasons to explain his record of dissent.
Fortunately, we need not look far. As it turns out, the decline
in dissent corresponds exactly with Judge Oakes's assumption of
the office of chief judge on December 31, 1988. It further appears
that such a reduction upon assumption of the chief judgeship is
not an anomaly; since at least 1959, every Second Circuit chief
judge has dissented less as chief judge than he did before assuming
the office. To be sure, some of the reduction is attributable to the
slightly smaller caseload a chief judge may carry, in deference to
his or her administrative responsibilities. But the slightly reduced
caseload of a chief judge cannot explain reductions in dissent in
excess of fifty percent, as occurred with Judges Friendly and Fein-
berg, and is occurring with Chief Judge Oakes. Nor can it explain
why the rates of dissent of former chief judges tend to remain de-
pressed after they leave the office of chief judge.
What can explain such a reduction? Chance cannot, for the
reductions are too frequent and too extreme. The best explanation
is that the office of Chief Judge increases one's sensitivity to the
importance of collegiality on the court 192 and, concomitantly, to
the tendency of dissent to damage collegiality. Such increased sen-
sitivity results from the fact that the Chief Judge is responsible for
a myriad of administrative duties, many of which cannot be satis-
factorily accomplished without the assistance of his or her col-
leagues. Those colleagues, of course, each enjoy the utmost in job
security regardless of the level of cooperation they afford the chief
judge; thus lacking the stick, it is no surprise that chief judges turn
to the carrot. They more directly than other judges have a stake in
collegiality beyond collegiality itself.
If reductions in dissent among judges who attain the position
of chief judge may be attributed to a changed appreciation for the
benefits that such reductions might bring-and, since ascension to
12 See Feinberg, supra note 11, at 384-86 (noting importance of collegiality); Oakes,
supra note 27, at 706-08 (same).
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the chief judgeship is unlikely to change one's views as to other
matters that may affect one's rate of dissent, such as the approach
one takes to constitutional and statutory interpretation, this seems
a fair conclusion-then we also may fairly conclude that rates of
dissent among different judges are also affected by differing appre-
ciations for the benefits of restraint in dissent. Applying these pro-
positions to the particular case of Chief Judge Oakes, if the current
chief judge's substantial decrease in dissent since becoming chief
can be attributed to an increased appreciation for the benefits of
restraint-and, again, there is little else to which a decrease of
such magnitude can be attributed-then we also may fairly con-
clude that a substantial part of the reason Judge Oakes developed
such an extraordinary record of dissent compared to his colleagues
is that he then possessed a comparatively lesser appreciation for
restraint's benefits.
To be sure, there are other reasons that Chief Judge Oakes,
before he became chief judge, dissented so much more often than
his colleagues. For example, Chief Judge Oakes always has taken a
decidedly liberal approach to constitutional law, an approach that
has not been shared by most of his colleagues over the course of
the last two decades. Since attaining the chief judgeship, Chief
Judge Oakes has continued to demonstrate, in dissent, this liberal
bent. Indeed, the Chief Judge's record of dissent on constitutional
issues since becoming chief judge reinforces the contention that
the recent decline in the frequency of his dissent is due to an in-
creased appreciation for the benefits to collegiality of increased re-
straint. One might expect that conflicts in constitutional interpre-
tation would be most resistant to the conforming effect of an
increasing collegial urge; as expected, then, while the sample is yet
too small to be statistically significant, the percentage of Chief
Judge Oakes's dissents implicating constitutional issues has risen
as his overall rate of dissent has declined.
For the practitioner, the lesson in all this is small; namely,
that the pattern of dissent of a judge before becoming chief judge
may not be a reliable indicator of the judge's actions after becom-
ing chief judge. An exception may lie in those cases the judge views
as being of exceptional importance.
The larger and more important lesson is one most appropri-
ately directed not at practitioners, but at appellate judges them-
selves. The demonstrable fact that judges decrease their rates of
dissent upon ascension to the chief judgeship should illustrate to
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judges, more convincingly than even the most eloquent articulation
of dissent's detriments ever could, the vital importance of collegial-
ity and restraint in dissent. Time after time, their most exper-
ienced colleagues have suppressed their rates of dissent so that col-
legiality might prosper and the tasks of the chief judge might
successfully be performed. Actions speak louder than words, it is
said, and, as a rule, more truly, too. For at least the last three de-
cades, the actions of the Second Circuit's chief judges have shouted
as one: we should not dissent as often as we do.
I The suggestion that this lesson is properly limited to chief
judges is not well taken. The tasks for which the chief judge re-
quires an atmosphere of collegiality to perform are not, after all,
tasks whose successful performance resounds only to the greater
glory of the chief judge; rather, successful performance reflects well
on the court as a whole, as unsuccessful performance reflects
poorly on the court as a whole. Quite evidently, this is a lesson the
broadening experience of being chief judge teaches masterfully;
however, while the experience of being chief judge may be the
greatest teacher of this lesson, other judges should keep in mind
that the greatest student of it is the judge who is able to learn
enough from the experience of others so as to make redundant the
lessons of personal experience.
CONCLUSION
A foolish unanimity is the hobgoblin of little minds, but a
foolish dissent is too. The object is to avoid foolishness. All things
considered, dissents aid in accomplishing this end, in the same way
that the functionally analogous first amendment right of free
speech aids in the exposure of error and the discovery of truth.1
93
193 The invisible hand of the marketplace of ideas extends to all courts as well. Viewed
in this light, the preeminence of the Second Circuit during mid-century begins to partake a
bit of a dog-bites-man quality, as the wisdom of the folk and the sense of the common long-
ago established that three hands are better than one. One case in which the Second Circuit
had all three hands working is United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce,
72 F.2d 705 (1934). In that case, the two visible Hands held that Joyce's masterwork was not
"obscene" within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1930, and therefore could be admitted
into the United States. Judge Manton emphatically dissented, which illustrates the disqui-
eting fact-disquieting for those who would be dissent's defenders-that the same freedom
that allows a judicial Ulysses to be published as a dissent, also allows unfettered publication
of works of a considerably less distinguished character. But though the judge's freedom to
dissent may in practice sometimes merely provide the opportunity for one to, let's charita-
bly say, remove all doubts as to one's wisdom, a similar problem results from the exercise of
the analogous right of free speech. In the free speech realm, the United States has wagered
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At the same time, however, dissents pose dangers, the worst of
which are made all the more dangerous by their insidiousness. Cal-
culation of a court's rate of dissent provides no direct measure of a
court's achievement' 94-strong courts do dissent at rates both high
and low-but this does not mean that strong courts with a high
rate of dissent are strong because of their record of dissent, nor
does it mean that such courts would not be stronger still if their
rate of dissent were lower. Rather, such courts may be regarded as
having triumphed despite their record of dissent.
The Second Circuit, during the 1940's and for a considerable
time thereafter, was a court of this type. The appropriate lesson to
draw from the existence of such courts is that the importance of
unanimity pales in comparison to the importance of appointing as
federal appellate judges only persons of the highest caliber in abil-
ity, diligence, training, and experience; the strengths of such judges
may override problems caused by dissent. But this is a lesson best
directed at the elected branches of government.
For appellate judges, the lessons of dissent may be recast as
reflections upon the virtues of the qualities of restraint, modesty,
and prudence. Proper appreciation for these qualities, which are
characteristic of the ensemble player and not the soloist, puts an
appellate judge in good stead because appellate courts exercise
their authority by means of majority opinions, which opinions, as
the First Circuit has noted, "are not solos but concertos.' 19 5
When the music of the majority becomes too dull or too dis-
cordant, however, soloing may be appropriate. In such circum-
stances, it is incumbent upon the soloing judge to prepare with
care his alternative composition. When restraint does fall to dis-
may, when modesty does fall to duty, then prudence demands that
the resulting dissent be, with allowances for avoidance of duplica-
tion, a fully reasoned, alternative opinion.
In recent years, the judges of the Second Circuit have demon-
strated admirably the qualities that the lessons of dissent suggest
one is well-advised to foster. They have established an enviable
record, one as worthy of emulation by judges who know themselves
to sit on courts as rich in judicial talent as was the Second Circuit
as a society that the costs do not exceed the benefits. In the appellate courts, for similar
reasons, the same result should obtain.
... Nor can one so assess a particular judge's achievement.
... Haddad v. Border Express, Inc., 303 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 1962) (Woodbury, C.J.,
concurring).
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during the years of Learned Hand's leadership, as it is worthy of
emulation by those judges who suspect that they do not.

